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The Argument
The purpose of this paper is to provide a proposal for 
the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. 
Although the utility of nuclear weapons is limited in regards 
to attaining foreign policy objectives, ironically, they may 
provide the means to world peace. Because of the deterring 
effect of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), it is not in 
the Superpowers' interests to engage in war with one another. 
If the stability of the current nuclear stalemate can be 
enhanced, the deterrent effect should be solidified and 
perpetuated. By increasing stability and decreasing ten­
sions, the Superpowers can securely accept military parity. 
Once they recognize that a first-strike capability is not 
desirable, then a comprehensive nuclear test ban and nuclear 
freeze is feasible. Eventually, significant arms reductions 
can take place. The Superpowers only need a minimum-MAD 
capability to maintain the deterrent effect and retain the 
balance-of-power that exists today. Other countries need 
only develop a minimum nuclear deterrent to safeguard their 
respective national securities.
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The Assumptions
1) Nuclear Deterrence- A country will not attack another 
if the costs of aggression outweigh the benefits of victory. 
Minimum deterrence will create unacceptable costs to an 
aggressor, while MAD will result in mutual annihilation.
Thus, although a country possessing a minimum deterrent could 
lose a nuclear war, it should never occur in the first place. 
For countries possessing a MAD capability, the deterrent 
effect is even stronger, as the instigator will be destroyed.
2) Rational Man- A rational leader will not commit his 
country to unacceptable losses, especially mutual suicide, if 
a real or perceived threat of nuclear retaliation exists.
This is the rationale behind MAD deterrence.
3) Stability increases the deterrent effect- Because 
the deterrent effect stems from the ability to inflict 
unacceptable losses on an aggressor, measures that ensure a 
retaliatory capability and enhance the current nuclear 
stalemate are important. Also, measures that reduce tensions 
and misperceptions should be adopted. A rational man may not 
make a rational decision if his perceptions of a situation are 
not accurate.
4) Destabilizing actions diminish the deterrent effect- 
Clearly, policies that attempt to make a nuclear war fight- 
able, and programs whose purpose is to gain a first-strike 
capability are dangerous and should be abandoned. The former 
denies the risk of nuclear escalation and the latter tries to 
circumvent the nuclear threat by cheating a country out of its 
retaliatory ability.
5) The SuperpQtfsr a gged only, a Mini-MAP saMfellifcy- Once a country is assured that it can annihilate an aggressor, 
any additional weapons are costly and purposeless. By 
reducing their arsenals to the Mini-MAD level the Superpowers 
perpetuate their nuclear hegemony over the world.
6) Other countries should develop a minimum deterrent- 
Horizontal and vertically proliferating countries maximize 
their marginal utilities by accepting a minimum deterrent 
capability that safeguards national security, costs little 
(when compared to entering the arms race), and yields politi­
cal clout, while not upsetting the balance-of-power (if the 
supplier countries control acquisition). Thus, the likelihood 
of conventional war may be reduced because of the threat of 
nuclear escalation. The Superpowers also benefit because 
their risk of being drawn into an escalating conflict is 
thereby diminished, and they are not threatened by vertical
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proliferation.
A new nuclear power will be deterred from employing its 
arsenal offensively because its foe(s) will be able to inflict 
unacceptable damages vis-a-vis its/their own arsenal(s). 
However, supplier countries must ensure that current military 
stalemates between unstable, or rival countries are not upset. 
For instance, a small nuclear country like South Africa is 
currently able deter attack, even though it is virtually 
surrounded by potential enemies, because its enemies do no* 
possess a similar military capability.
Forward
For the first time in man's history, the costs of total 
war are potentially so great that they outweigh any possible 
benefits which may accrue from either a pre-emptive attack or 
a first-strike from strength. For the Superpowers total war 
has become synonymous with nuclear war, and limited conven­
tional battles have a historical tend^jy to escalate. Today 
nuclear weapons are potentially so devastating that man may 
have finally found the key to peace, through the threat of 
mutually assured annihilation. Just one of the 10,000 U.s. 
nine megaton missiles has a greater destructive capacity than 
all of the bombs dropped in World War II combined, plus the 
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. People often cannot 
even think about what life, if any survives, would be like 
after a nuclear war. We have made an instrument of death 
that we cannot stomach. It is too gruesome. Nuclear war is 
not about chivalry, or bravery, it is war without a face. In
6the roost horrific sense, nuclear weapons have truly made war 
hell.
It is not probable that war will ever 
absolutely cease until science discovers 
some destroying force so simple in its 
administration, so horrible in its 
effects, that all art, all gallantry will 
be at an end, and battles will be 
massacres which the feelings of mankind 
will be unable to endure. (Mayers, 1984, 
P. 82)
The historical and strategic analyses that constitute 
the first section of this paper are intended to support my 
assertions regarding the dangerous nature of limited nuclear 
war fighting strategies and defensive weaponry, while also 
providing a means of substantiating the legitimacy of my 
proposals for the future that will constitute the paper's 
final section. The second section of this paper will contain 
measures that will improve relations between the Superpowers 
and solidify the nuclear stalemate that exists between them. 
Once a more stable international climate is achieved, many of 
the potentially destabilizing and threatening policies that 
are currently being practiced can safely be abandoned. In 
addition to suggesting a role for the nuclear weapons of 
other countries, the final section of the paper will suggest 
ways in which the peaceful climate established in the second 
section, can be transformed into meaningful treaties between 
the Superpowers that allow for significant nuclear arms 
reductions to take place.
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I. Historical and Strategic Analyses
Even before the introduction of the atomic bomb against 
the Japanese during World War II, Americans have been bur­
dened with one troublesome problem: What does one do with a
nuclear bomb? Civilian strategists have generally considered 
that an all-out nuclear exchange is not a really a war at 
all; instead, it is mutual suicide because the losses on both 
sides will be so great that no one can win. In contrast, 
United States military thought revolves around attempts to 
make the unthinkable, a nuclear exchange, tolerable. In this 
first section I will attempt to provide historical justifica­
tion for the following assertions that underlie my major 
proposals for the role of nuclear weapons in international 
relations. It is obvious that much of the deterrent effect 
of nuclear weapons is contingent upon the catastrophic 
results of their use. (1) Therefore, attempts at minimizing 
these effects are destabilizing and threaten the balance-of- 
power that exists between the Superpowers. (2) Co*. ,equently, 
the likelihood of a nuclear exchange is actually enhanced by 
trying to manipulate the outcome of an exchange. (3)
Although limited and prolonged war fighting capabilities, 
along with the development of defensive weapons systems, are 
some of the most fervently embraced concepts of U.S. military 
strategists; they are nonetheless a threat to world peace and 
should be abandoned as U.S. policy objectives.
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Where We Have Been
In order to understand where to go in the future with 
nuclear weapons, one must first look to the past. Only by 
examining the interrelated developments of nuclear arms, 
strategies, and treaties can their respective successes and 
failures be analyzed and a course for the future be sug­
gested. Although technological developments have played a 
large role in the formation of nuclear strategies and 
treaties in the United States, the beliefs of the men in 
power have played an equally large role. From the 1940s the 
RAND Corporation has served as a think-tank for U.S. nuclear 
strategy. The ideas of the RAND corporation have routinely 
influenced the policies of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of 
Defense from Truman to Reagan, and from Dulles to Weinberger. 
More importantly, because of the enhanced power of the United 
States after World War II, U.S. nuclear strategy was to 
necessarily influence the Soviet Union and the world. The 
predominance of U.S. military and economic might through the 
li6Cs, and its continued strength today, has both intention­
ally and unintentionally influenced the politics of the 
world. Therefore, a study of the United State's nuclear 
development, coupled with the unique perspectives of the 
Soviet Union and the rest of the world's powers, provides an 
interesting background for proposals for the future.
The Truman years (1945-1952) were a time of wonder and
9
bewilderment for the United States. We had unquestioned 
military superiority after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only 
question was how could this military superiority best be 
transferred into political influence? The Baruch Plan of 1946 
was doomed to failure for the same reason that many of 
today's political options do not come to fruition: a mono­
poly of anything is difficult to give-up. The United Nations 
proposal for an international agency to ensure that atomic 
energy would be used solely for peaceful purposes was 
rejected by the Soviets, who wanted U.S. nuclear weapons 
destroyed before the agency was established. Naturally, the 
U.S. wanted the international agency before relinquishing 
sole possession of the bomb. Although the U.S. never actu­
ally intended to eliminate its nuclear weapons, Truman appar­
ently saw the possible hazards that could result from the 
destabilizing effects of an unchecked nuclear superiority.
... the atomic bomb is a means of 
destruction hitherto unknown, against 
which there can be no adequate defense, 
and in the employment of which no single 
nation can in fact have a monopoly.
(Mayers, 1984, P. 3)
Truman did not have long to worry about the U.S. mono­
poly because the Soviet Union detonated its first A-bomb 
during 1949. The Korean War that began the following year 
precluded any possibilities of disarmament treaties? soon the 
genie would be irrevocably out of the bottle. In 1952 the 
U.S. detonated its first Hydrogen bomb. The U.S.s.R. sur­
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prised the United States by detonating its own H-bomb in 
1953. Apparently, the technology gap was not gaping.
The Eisenhower years (19.5,3-19601 encompassed perhaps the 
greatest (or worst) of military achievements; the ability to 
completely destroy the world. Eisenhower said, "... Humanity 
has now achieved, for the first time in its history, the 
power to end its history.M(Mayers, 1984, P. 5) Unfortu­
nately, this capability evolved during a period of high 
tensions and poor communications known as the Cold War.
Ike's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, indiscri­
minately used threats of "Massive Retaliation," whereby the 
U.S. might respond with nuclear weapons to Soviet challenges 
anywhere in the world. However, the invasions of Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia demonstrated the difficulty in translating 
nuclear military might into successful foreign policy objec­
tives. True, the U.S. could have dealt devastating and 
decisive blows to the Soviets in the 1950s, but the U.S. was 
not willing to make a nuclear commitment to these countries 
and the Soviet Union knew this. Thus, the threat was not 
credible, and the Soviets were not deterred because of their 
advantage in conventional forces in Europe. The U.S. had 
learned its first lesson about the limited political utility 
of nuclear weapons.
To give the U.S. a meaningful edge against U.S.S.R. 
conventional forces in Europe, tactical nuclear weapons were 
deployed in Central Europe. They consisted of artillery
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shells, bombs and short range missiles. In 1957, the Soviets 
first tested their ICBM, and the U.S. began to fear a missile 
gap was developing, despite the fact that the Soviet's ICBM 
lacked an accurate delivery system and the U.S. now had 6200 
nuclear weapons. (Mayers, 1984, P. 6)
By 1955 the Superpowers realized that already built 
nuclear weapons would be impossible to verify; therefore, 
attention turned from disarmament to limiting new testing. 
Ike's Open Skies Plan (1955) was rejected by the Soviets; 
however, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 was much more appealing 
in that it allowed completely open verification of all facil­
ities by all countries, but the it took place on neutral
grauraL.
National Technical Means (NTM), or seismic monitoring, 
became standard procedure for verification in 1958, and 
through the SALT treaties it was considered adequate.
(Mayers, 1984, P. 75-6) Because countries now felt more 
secure in their perceptions, a Limited Test Ban Treaty became 
possible in 1963.
The Kennedv/Johnson years (1961-19481 showed a rapid 
transition in U.S. nuclear strategy. The limited utility of 
MAD for achieving foreign policy objectives, and the lack of 
options it presented for a president involved in a confronta­
tion, led naturally to the development of a "Flexible 
Response." In this manner, the military forces could deal 
flexibly with varying levels of Soviet aggression.
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In 1961 Kennedy said, "Mankind must put an end to war or 
war will put an end to mankind."(Mayers, 1984, P. 10) These 
words nearly became prophetic one year later the Cuban Mis­
sile Crisis. The crisis was peacefully resolved as much 
because of the U.S. conventional naval superiority in the 
region, as because of the nuclear superiority the U.S. pos­
sessed in 1962. Not to be overlooked however, was the face 
saving, tension reducing option Kennedy gave to Khruschev. 
Kennedy promised to remove (the then obsolete) U.S. missiles 
from Turkey, in exchange for the Soviets removing their 
missiles from Cuba. Even though Kennedy had planned to 
remove the missiles anyway, his "trade-off" gave the impres­
sion of a bargaining process.
Kennedy's Secretary of State John McNamara rejected the 
concept of a "Controlled Response"— the targeting of nuclear 
weapons rather than population centers and factories.
Instead, he believed in deterrence by assured retaliatory 
capability, whereby neither side has the ability to defend 
itself from unacceptable consequences. As a result of this 
desire for an assured retaliation capability, the U.S. 
developed the Triad system of ICBMs, strategic bombers and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that is still 
in use today.
After the Cuban scare, both countries were willing to 
come to the negotiation table. The Limited Test Ban Treaty 
(LTBT) prohibited atmospheric nuclear tests in 1963. The
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Outer Space Treaty (1967) prohibited nuclear weapons in 
space. However, perhaps the most significant treaty to be 
signed in the 1960s was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). 
It sought to halt the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons to 
other countries, while also striving "... To achieve at the 
earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race 
and to undertake effective measures in the direction of 
nuclear disarmament."(Mayers, 1984, P. 30) Unfortunately, 
just as the nuclear arena appeared to be stabilizing, single 
missiles with multiple warheads or MIRVs were developed in 
1968, making arms control more difficult.
The Nixon/FQrd years (1969.-lg.Z61 saw a massive build-up 
of Soviet nuclear forces. When Kennedy took office the 
Soviets had 20 ICBMs. When Johnson took office the number 
had risen to 200. By 1969, the Soviets had 800 ICBMs.
(Mayers, 1984, P. 13) The Soviet forces had grown so large 
that a nuclear exchange would devastate both countries. The 
Soviet equivalent to the U.S. policy of assured retaliatory 
capability became known as "sufficiency." Nixon and Kis­
singer now realized that parity was inevitable. Therefore, a 
lessening of tensions or detente was attempted to avoid 
confrontation and thaw the remnants of the Cold War.
The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) was 
signed in 1972, limiting defensive anti-ballistic missiles 
(ABMs) development and deployment. Also, the Interim Agree­
ment on Offensive Weapons froze the number of launchers of
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ballistic missiles and froze the number of ICBM silos. In 
1974, the ABM Treaty limited the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to one 
site each for defensive missile systems. This move was very 
important because it helped ensure that a country could not 
launch a first-strike without suffering grave losses.
By 1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger proposed 
greater emphasis on a U.S. "counter-force1 strategy. He 
supported selective strike targeting against military tar­
gets. Counter-force was a classic example of an attempt to 
develop an active nuclear war-fighting capability. Limited 
war theories are flawed in two ways. First, they are based 
on the assumption that a nuclear exchange can be controlled. 
This is an uncertain premise at best. Second, making a 
nuclear war survivable through defensive weapons or selective 
targeting only decreases the deterrent effect to using 
nuclear weapons in the first place.
Gerald Ford made an interesting statement regarding the 
role of the U.S. nuclear force in a 1976 address:
The weapons we hold today, and those we 
plan for the future, give America a 
mighty power. But with such power comes 
a mighty responsibility. We must never 
forget the purpose for which our arsenal 
is intended. That purpose is not to 
terrify the weak, to provoke armed 
confrontation, nor lay claim to that 
which is not ours. (Mayers, 1984, P. 13)
The Single Integrated Operating Plans (SIOPs) of the 
1970s were valuable in that they coordinated the various
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branches of the U.S. Armed Forces under one unified targeting 
plan to avoid needless duplication of sites. However, the 
sites selected bore the mark of a counter-force mentality. 
Small Attacks were planned against military targets, leaving 
the cities hostage as a bargaining chip to incite negotia­
tions, (Mayers, 1984, P. 16)
The Carter years (1976-1980) are best characterized as 
good intentions gone awry. SALT II was stalled in 1975/76 
over disagreements on cruise missiles and a "no bargaining" 
policy with the Soviets during the 1976 election campaign. 
When eventually signed in 1979, SALT II contained much of 
Carter's "comprehensive package" that limited a wide variety 
of weapons. Unfortunately, this treaty was never ratified by 
the Senate because of questions regarding its verifiability. 
These concerns stemmed from the loss of a valuable Iran post, 
and the controversial compliance of the Soviets to the SALT I 
provisions. In addition, the insufficiently specific lan­
guage of the treaty bothered some Senators. (Carnesale, 1987, 
P. 307)
A second major event during the Carter era was the 
policy known as "Presidential Directive 59." It was a 
strategy for flexible and selective use of nuclear weapons, 
based on a supposition that the Soviets would start a limited 
nuclear war. The most easily foreseen circumstances for such 
an attack would be the long-feared Soviet invasion of Europe. 
Thus, the U.S. put Pershing II and cruise missiles in Central
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Europe to counteract the Soviet's intermediate range SS-20s
I maintain that this was not a stabilizing measure 
despite its appearances. The Soviet response could be 
likened to the U.S. reaction to Soviet missiles in Cuba. The 
U.S. weapons in Europe could reach many of their targets in 6 
to 8 minutes. (Mayers, 1984, P. 21) This was an unacceptable 
advancement that did upset our allies. They realized that 
they were to be the battlefield upon which the Superpowers 
would settle their differences. Also, a six minute warning 
left the Soviet leaders with little time to react to what may 
be a computer error or accident. Even worse, determining a 
limited attack from an all-out one, and acting accordingly, 
was impossible.
Although hard to believe, false alarms do occur and with 
alarming frequency. From January 1979 to June 1980, 147 
false alarms were reported that were so serious they required 
evaluation as to whether they represented a potential attack. 
In 1979, ten fighters from three U.S. bases were scrambled 
and sent airborne and U.S. missiles and submarines were put 
on higher alert after a NORAD operator in Colorado relayed to 
other NORAD bases the erroneous message that the U.S. was 
under Nuclear attack. In 1980, a failed 46 cent chip in a 
mini-computer relayed a similar message, and this time 100 
B52 bombers were readied for take-off as was the President's 
emergency aircraft. In the Pacific, the airborne command 
post took off from its base in Hawaii as well. (Mayers, 1984,
17
P. 35)
The Reaaan years (1980-1988) are marked by unprece­
dented peacetime military expenditures that are a part of 
Reagan's attempts to gain a "Margin of Safety" over the 
Soviets. I say "over" because a $180 Billion five-year 
strategic modernization program designed to add 7000 new 
weapons to U.S. stockpiles in the next ten years can only the 
result of a plan to gain a military advantage over the Sovi­
ets. (Mayers, 1984, P. 23) Besides the waste of money and 
resources, this plan merely fuels the arms race, because the 
Soviets are committed to not falling behind the United 
States. If the Soviets are currently attempting to gain a 
military advantage and the U.S. is only attempting to close a 
small gap, the money and resources are still being wasted— so 
long as the nuclear stalemate is retained. As I will soon 
demonstrate, any nuclear advantage that may occur from this 
build-up, in terms of numbers of weapons, translate into no 
political nor military utility.
Although Reagan has gone the wrong route with weapons, 
he has done very well in regards to weapons treaties. In 
1982, Reagan said, "We must seek agreements which are verifi­
able, equitable, and militarily significant. Agreements that 
provide only the appearance of arms control breed dangerous 
illusions."(Mayers, 1984, P. 23) Although a mutual and 
verifiable freeze on testing, production and deployment of 
nuclear weapon systems was passed by the House in 1983, it
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did not pass in the Senate. I believe that this proposal 
should be reintroduced once the Soviets agree to a verifi­
able, multilateral freeze. A freeze will put an end to the 
expense of the arms race and will help eliminate the develop­
ment. and deployment of new, destabilizing technology.
Also in 1983, Reagan proposed a Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START) that would "build-down" nuclear arsenals. The 
idea behind this program is to continue to build and deploy 
so long as more of the existing forces are retired. It has 
not been adopted, nonetheless it is an excellent way to 
maintain the current balance-of-power that exists today 
between the superpowers. In fact, part of the program calls 
for reductions in each country's military advantages by 
increasing their respective reductions in those areas.
Working toward parity can only increase the stability of u.s. 
and Soviet relations and increase the likelihood of continued 
peace.
By playing ’•hardball” with the Soviets vis-a-vis his 
“Zero Option" in Europe, Reagan was able to get the Soviets 
to agree to the INF Treaty in 1987. Reagan wanted the Sovi­
ets to eliminate their intermediate SS-20s, SS-4s, SS-5s 
missiles (approximately 600 total), or else the U.S. would 
deploy 572 Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe. 
(Mayers, 1984, P. 26) The initial results of the Zero Option 
was that the Soviets destroyed some of their weapons and the 
U.S. did not deploy as many as it had planned. It was in
19
both countries' best interests to eliminate these weapons 
entirely in 1987, even though one might argue that the Sovi­
ets were giving up more. For the Soviet Union had to dis­
mantle existing weapons, whereas the U.S. had to promise to 
dismantle some and promise not to deploy more. However, the 
Soviets did not relish the prospect of U.S. weapons so close 
to their borders, nor did Europeans embrace U.S. weapons on 
their soil. Meanwhile, the U.S. did not want to bear the 
expense of these weapons if they could get the Soviets to 
dismantle theirs.
Now that the basic developments in strategic thought, 
nuclear weaponry, and treaties have been placed into a chro­
nological context, I will discuss each of these topics in 
more depth. In order to understand the evolution of U.S. 
nuclear strategy, it is first necessary to understand the 
goals of U.S. nuclear policy:
1) basic deterrence: against Soviet attack.
2) extended deterrence: for U.S. allies.
3) crisis stability: minimum 1st strike incentives.
4) damage limitation: minimize attacks effects.
5) war-termination: in least damaging manner.
6) counter-deterrence: support U.S. foreign policy.
7) bargaining phlc? support u.s. policies in arms control 
negotiations. (P. 135, Harvard Group)
The Evolution of Post-War Strategic Thought
During the post-war 1940s, a dangerous concept developed
that is still being felt in the policies of the 1980s: The
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idea of a controllable nuclear war. Karl Von Clausewitz, the 
nineteenth-century Prussian military/philosopher, said, "War 
is a continuation of policy by other means."(Kaplan, 1983, P. 
79) One might be led to question whether nuclear war is too 
violent to be a form of diplomacy, but not the strategists at 
RAND. Bernard Brodie stated, "War is violence... but it is 
controlled violence and therefore controllable." Kaplan,
1983, P. 79) Although support for his contention would 
oscillate for the next four decades, it has never fallen 
completely out of favor.
A dangerous situation develops when the majority of a 
country's nuclear strategists are housed together and iso­
lated from "the real world." They developed an attitude that 
"the RAND way" was the only legitimate way of thinking about 
the bomb. "During the peak of the Cold War, most of its 
occupants did little but... dream up new ideas about nuclear 
war."(Kaplan, 1983, P. 51)
Popular in the 1940s was a theoretical w*r fighting 
strategy known as "game theory." The essence of game theory 
was to find out your opponent's best strategy and act accord­
ingly. "Such a strategy may not get you the maximum gain, 
but it will prevent you from taking the maximum 
loss."(Kaplan, 1983, P. 65) It provided mathematically 
precise methods of determining rational strategies in the 
face of critical uncertainties; however, game theory did not 
always reflect reality. After World War II, "It made sense
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for both countries to stop building, but neither could have 
the confidence to agree to a treaty... suspecting that the 
other side might cheat, build more and go on to win."(Kaplan, 
1983, P. 65)
During the 1950s, the U.S. held for the last time, a 
clear first-strike capability. However, by the end of the 
decade, this capability was diminishing and U.S. was feeling 
not only unprepared for war, but vulnerable to a Soviet first 
strike. In order to understand the beliefs behind counter­
force, limited war fighting strategy and intense feelings of 
vulnerability (i.e. missile gap) where none existed, it is 
helpful to hear the thoughts of the men of RAND.
Nitze, who wrote NSC-68, said that since the U.S. is 
"The principal center of power in the non-Soviet world (it) 
is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be 
destroyed.•• if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental 
design."(Kaplan, 1983, P. 139) NSC-68 became a guide for 
U.S. policy in the 1950s stressing the "Soviet design for 
world domination." Obviously, the U.S. feared the unknown 
intentions of its primary adversary, and remarks by Kruschev 
about crushing the U.S. did not put anyone at RAND at ease. 
Fears of the unknown manifested themselves in worst case 
scenarios and imagined or exaggerated threats.
With the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. wanted the 
extra protection of the Hydrogen bomb. Some realized though 
that "With something so powerful as the H-Bomb, strategic
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bombing of Soviet cities made no sense, it was immoral, and 
it was probably also suicidal.M(Kaplan, 1983, P. 81) Others 
however, did not agree. Albert Wohlstetter of RAND repre­
sented the majority of his colleagues with this statement:
We need not assume that this stage is 
unchangeable or that one country or the 
other cannot move into a position of 
relative advantage. The search for 
'technological breakthroughs' must 
continue. (Kaplan, 1983, P. 131)
Wohlstetter, by denying the deterrence of MAD, merely 
reflects the typical arms race mentality.
By 1952, the U.S. realized that it was potentially 
vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack. SAC was perceived as 
vulnerable because the U.S. B52 Bombers were too close to the 
Soviet Union (most were on oversees bases) and too densely 
packed. The Soviets could take away our retaliatory capabil­
ity by knocking out SAC while the bombers were still on the 
ground. After Pearl Harbor and the German assaults of World 
War II, surprise attacks were thought to be the way of 
aggressors.
In order to understand the development of 
post-war strategic thought it is neces­
sary to recognize the deep-rooted nature 
of the belief in the inevitability of a 
massive surprise attack as the opening 
shot in any war. (Freedman, 1981, P. 34)
For RAND, 1957 was a year of panic. First, the Gaither 
Report declared that the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviets
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and was now in the midst of a missile gap. It proposed a $44 
billion dollar build-up based on this misperception. Eisen­
hower was not affected by the report however? "Do you know 
how much a billion dollars is? Why, it's a stack of ten- 
dollar bills as high as the Washington Monument.11 (Kaplan,
1983, P. 147) I can not resist pointing out here that Rea­
gan's SDI program is expected to cost one trillion dollars. 
Other anxieties existed as well. Simulations showed that SAC 
was unable to ensure a U.S. retaliatory capability. Also, 
the dangers of fall-out were first realized. In effect, the 
nuclear stakes had been raised. Now instead of two million 
killed by a Soviet attack, it was estimated that the U.S. 
would suffer losses of twenty million to radiation. (Kaplan, 
1983, P. 125) Lastly, the launching of Sputnik alerted the 
U.S. that if the Russians could put a satellite on top of a 
rocket, they could possibly also put a nuclear warhead on it 
and make it come back and hit the United States. (Kaplan, 
1983, P. 136)
The ,,no-cities"*"war-f ighting"*"counter-force" strategy 
was developed by Bernard Brodie in 1951. Regardless of the 
name it meant the same thing. If the Soviets attacked West 
Europe for instance, the U.S. would attack military targets 
in the Soviet Union, not their cities, at least in the first 
round. The U.S. would then attack the cities one by one 
until they gave-up. It is hard to believe that the Soviets 
would today, sit idly by while we destroyed their cities "one
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by one." The difference between then and the current situa­
tion is that the Soviets did not possess an effective deliv­
ery system for their ICBMs until the 1960s. At this time, 
the idea of counter-force became less practical. If this 
strategy were employed today, one would expect an all-out, or 
at least a like mannered response by the Soviets on U.S. 
territory. If the Soviets had made the decision to enter 
Western Europe, they obviously considered and disregarded a 
possible U.S. response. Deterrence has failed and limited 
war is not likely to dissuade the Soviets from their objec­
tives.
The support of counter-force appears to have mixed at 
best. Herman Kahn, in 1956, claimed that by targeting only 
military targets, merely two million Soviets would die. He 
also maintained that the U.53. should build a $200 Billion 
civil defense system. He claimed that any power that could 
evacuate a large proportion of its population was in a much 
better bargaining position, but he fails to recognize how 
attempts at ensuring nuclear survivability increase the 
likelihood of a pre-emptive nuclear first-strike. The Weap­
ons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) said in 1956 that coun­
ter-force would not work, one week into the Kennedy Adminis­
tration. It said that even if the U.S. destroyed all target- 
able weapons, the non-targetable ones would kill half the 
U.S. population. With civil defense, sixty million would be 
killed. But, this is another instance of misperceptions
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creating (then) unnecessary panic because the Soviets had no 
way of getting the missiles to the U.S. population in 1956. 
Although Kennedy's Secretary of Defense John McNamara liked 
most of WSEG-50, he still supported the viability of counter­
force.
Bill Kaufman, whom McNamara respected greatly, liked the
idea of limited war, only he foresaw it being fought on a
conventional level:
Nuclear weapons must, therefore, be 
avoided in limited war because they are 
"new and strange." They have about them 
all and more of the sinister psychologi­
cal connotations of gas or dum-dum 
bullets... They have tended to fall into 
that very arbitrary category of weapons 
that are regarded as uncivilized to use.
(Kaplan, 1983, P. 168-169)
I believe his statement reaffirms my contention that 
wars are more likely to be fought if the means of destruction 
can somehow be rationalized. On a infinitely smaller scale 
it is similar to claiming that hanging is a cruel and unusual 
punishment for a capital offense, but a lethal injection is 
tolerable because it does not shock our senses to the same 
extent. If one finds injections tolerable, is not the like­
lihood of their occurrence enhanced with the same net result?
During the late 1950s the mistaken belief of a missile 
gap was more propaganda than substance. The U.S. had U-2 
intelligence that the populace did not. In addition, photo­
graphs from the Discoverer satellite proved that no gap
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existed. Only SAC held out, MFor they had a critical inter­
est in depicting an enormous Soviet threat. Without it, they 
would have a hard time justifying their own plans for thou­
sands of U.S. bombers and 10,000 Minutemen ICBMs." (Kaplan, 
1983, P. 288) However, the RAND group feared a "deterrence 
gap" might be developing whereby SAC might be vulnerable. 
This, not the missiles, is what they considered most impor­
tant. By 1961, Kennedy admitted that there was in fact no 
gap.
To help safeguard the U.S. retaliatory response (a good 
idea), RAND decided that ABMs should defend Minutemen silos, 
not U.S. cities (not a good idea). The so called "Safeguard 
Defense" was terribly vulnerable to a number of counter 
measures that the Soviets could easily and cheaply prepare: 
saturation, multiple warheads, decoys, and radar black-outs. 
Another problem with ABMs is that a defensive build-up would 
assuredly promote a corresponding increase in the opponents 
offensive arsenal. "In the race between offense and defense, 
offense would win, and at a lower cost."(Kaplan, 1983, P.
327) McNamara realized that "damage limiting," as military 
justification for more weapons would not work.
WSEG and SIOP reflected the polarity of opinion in 
nuclear strategy of the 1960s. WSEG-53 supported a limited 
war perspective, while SIOP-62 advocated an all-out nuclear 
strike. Although the limited war theory was embraced in the 
early 1960s, it was soon replaced by MAD. Thomas Schelling's
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1960 book, The Strategy of Conflict described the purpose of 
limited war as defeating the enemy's will without compelling 
him to bring nuclear weapons into play. This idea strongly 
appealed to those who felt constrained by Massive Retaliation 
theory. Schelling based his idea on the results of a Zero- 
Sum game. In pure competition, my win is your loss? however, 
after two payoffs the not outcome is zero. In a Non-Zero sum 
game (like a limited war), competition with tacit cooperation 
yields benefits. (Kaplan, 1983, P. 331)
RAND's Bill Kaufmann saw non-nuclear limited wars as 
rational because the war would stop when the costs of conti­
nuing outweighed the advantages of continuing it. He 
believed that the purpose of limited war was to achieve a 
sustained stalemate. Winning was unreasonable, for both 
sides had unlimited resources and these battles were not 
meant to bring about a radical redistribution of power. 
(Kaplan, 1983, P. 199) He advocated large conventional 
forces, which obviously pleased the military. He claimed 
that you can blow-up large territories with the A-Bomb, but 
you need ground forces to occupy territories. (Kaplan, 198,
P. 195)
The problem with counterforce that soon became apparent, 
and should have caused policy shift to stalemate deterrence, 
was the ability or inability of the Soviets to distinguish 
the large number of incoming missiles from an all-out attack. 
If the Soviets could not distinguish between the two, an
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all-out retaliatory blow against U.S. cities was feared. 
Kissinger argued that the Pentagon options were not sensible.
It was the perennial dilemma: how to plan a nuclear
attack that was large enough to terrify the Soviets but small 
enough to be recognized as a limited strike. (Kaplan, 1983,
P. 357)
McNamara changed his support from counterforce to MAD in 
1963. McNamara realized that counterforce presented no 
logical limit to the size of the arsenal? that as long as new 
targets could be found or the Soviets developed new weapons? 
the U.S. could always claim that it did not have enough. 
(Kaplan, 1983, P. 316) "The new measure put almost total 
emphasis on the deterrence, rather than on the fighting, of 
nuclnr war(Kaplan, 1983, P. 317)
Bernard Brodie described the changing face of war in his 
1946 book The Absolute Weapon. He said, "Thus far the chief 
purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. 
From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can 
have almost no other useful purpose."(Kaplan, 1983, P. 340)
It was not until the 1960s however, that Brodie was forced to 
cc ldude that "Nuclear strategy itself— the body of thoughts 
that he himself had helped formulate—  was something of an 
illusion."(Kaplan, 1983, P. 342) To Brodie, the very 
existence of nuclear weapons and an unequivocal policy to use 
them on the battlefield were the best guarantees against 
their use in the first place. (Kaplan, 1983, P. 340) Deter-
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ronce offered the twin benefits of National Security and low 
cost, but the Vietnam War proved that atomic reliance alone 
will not deter aggression. A Schelling-1ike, large conven­
tional force must be maintained for battles of will in a 
limited war,
Although not rational for nuclear war, counter-force was
still a good policy for wars of lesser force. Kaufman's
limited war concept was behind the U.S. policy in Vietnam.
The enemy was to get "messages" and "accept limitations." The
U.S. was hoping for a stalemate by trying to make the costs
too great for the North Vietnamese to endure.
By early 1965, McNamara's Vietnam 
strategy was essentially a conventional- 
war version of the counter-force/no 
cities theory—  using force as an 
instrument of coercion, withholding a 
larger force that could kill the hostage 
of the enemy's cities if he didn't back 
down. (Kaplan, 1983, P. 329)
The 1970s clearly demonstrated that leaders do not 
always learn from the mistakes of the past. New technologi­
cal developments threatened the stability of the nuclear 
stalemate and the U.S. returned to a limited war strategy. 
Hope springs eternal among strategists that the U.S. -an find 
a practical way to make our nuclear arsenal useable.
In the mid-1970s the Soviets began te ing MTRVed mis­
siles. "The age-old red flag of SAC vulnerability could be 
waved with hew vigor(Kaplan, 1983, p. 374) The MIRV threat 
was addressed by hardening the U.S. ICBM silos to ensure a
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retaliatory response. Despite increased missile targeting 
accuracy in the 1970s, U.S. strategists considered the ICBMs 
to be fairly safe because no Soviet or U.S. missile had ever 
been tested on its actual trajectory over the North Pole's 
magnetic field, only in an East-West/West-East trajectory. 
Second, many incoming missiles were expected to destroy 
themselves in a process known as "fratricide," because of the 
blast heat, wind, radiation, neutrons and debris. (Kaplan, 
1983, P. 375)
Carter originally spoke of eliminating all nuclear 
weapons, but with Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, soldiers 
in Cuba, and other real world developments, he saw that this 
was not advisable. Harold Brown, Carter's Secretary of 
Defense, was skeptical of counterforce in 1975, saying, "Only 
deterrence is feasible.M(Kaplan, 1983, P. 383) Soon however, 
he had completely reversed his position in favor of the 
flexible war nuclear posture advocated by former Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger. Schlesinger supported the NUWEP, 
NSDM-242, and NU-OPTS plans developed in 1973 by the Odeen 
Group and Foster Panel. In 1977, Carter reaffirmed support 
for the NSDM~242 plan of the Foster Panel as part of his 
Presidential Directive-59 that sought limited nuclear options 
and a protracted nuclear war fighting capability, primarily 
by ensuring communications. (Kaplan, 1983, P. 369)
In the 1980s, Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) or "Star Wars" program is merely another chapter in the
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ABM game, except now the missiles are to be replaced by 
lasers. I will discuss this program's negative effect on 
deterrence, the arms race, stability, and the U.S. economy 
later. Most of Reagan's military spending increases, SDI 
aside, have been the result of following Carter initiatives 
that resulted in higher spending because of his counter-force 
belief.
Since 1946, nuclear strategy has oscillated with the
individuals in power. With nuclear weapons, no one's opinion
is sacrosanct. There is no true authority, only informed
individuals making educated guesses about the Apocalypse:
The story of nuclear strategy ha3 been 
the story of intellectuals... trying to 
make the atomic and later the hydrogen 
bomb manageable, controllable, to make it 
conform to human proportions. The 
nuclear strategists had come to impose 
order—  but in the end, chaos still 
prevailed. (Kaplan, 1983 P. 391)
Examining nuclear strategy from a U.S. perspective is 
useful in understanding many of the nuclear policy develop­
ments of the U.S. and other countries, but the United States 
is not the only nuclear country, nor the only country with a 
unique nuclear perspective. Surprisingly, or maybe not so, 
the Soviet Union appears to have a nuclear perspective that 
most resembles that held by the United States. I make this 
assertion not because we share a similar world view to the 
Soviets, but because they are the country whose nuclear 
capability is most like our own. There is no other country
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close. Therefore, to be able to suggest world-wide solu­
tions, requires one to adopt a world-wide viewpoint.
Other States' Perspectives
After one has discussed the superpowers, the focus must 
naturally turn toward the other nuclear countries. Each has 
its own motivation for developing a nuclear capability based 
on its own unique circumstances. Capabilities and ambitions 
are obviously going to vary from country to country accord­
ingly.
China is currently the only other communist country to 
possess an independent nuclear arsenal, but it is by no means 
in the Soviet fold. Although the U.S. and China are cur­
rently enjoying good relations, the U.S. was part of the 
reason that China decided to develop an independent nuclear 
arsenal in the first place. China felt a strong need for an 
independent deterrent against threatening nuclear adversar­
ies:
Thrice in eight years she was at the receiving end of 
nuclear threats from the United States--in 1950, 1953 and 
195§• The Taiwan Straits incident of 1958 amply demonstrated 
to the Chinese that they would not be able to rely for pro­
tection on the Soviet nuclear umbrella. (Kincade, 1982. P.
3 4 )
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The Chinese have been the roost consistent of all in 
their views of nuclear strategy. Maoist doctrine stresses 
the importance of the individual as the ultimate determinate 
of victory. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the Chinese 
believe in the limited utility of nuclear weapons, clearly 
and consistently underestimating their destructiveness. Mao 
explained the Communist Party's stance in 1946 by saying,
"The atom bomb is a paper tiger with which the American 
reactionaries try to terrify the people."(Freedman, 1981, P. 
274) Khruschev once attempted to explain to Mao, to no 
avail, that "... With the atomic bomb, the number of troops 
on each side makes practically no difference to the alignment 
of real power and the outcome of a war. The more troops on a 
side, the more bomb fodder."(Freedman, 1981, P. 281) This 
advise would obviously not be taken well by a nan in charge 
of one quarter of the world's population.
Before discussing France and Britain as individual 
countries, I will briefly elaborate on a more general West 
European perspective. The Europeans have three primary 
worries in regards to the superpowers.
1) Europe becoming a nuclear battlefield.
2) A fear of being abandoned by the U.S.
3) A loss of dignity after being world 
powers for so long, and now being 
directed on security matter by an upstart 
United States. (Freedman, 1981, P. 287)
The first two points above are intimately related; the 
alleviation of one fear seems to automatically increase the
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other. The presence of U.S. troops in Europe increases the 
credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in Europe because 
it increases the American commitment to its allies. The 
Europeans fear of becoming a battlefield stems from the fact 
that U.S. ground forces in Europe, besides helping balance 
conventional forces with the Soviet Bloc, also could induce a 
whole-hearted nuclear commitment by the U.S. if American 
soldiers were killed by invading forces. (Freedman, 1981, P. 
290) The fear of desertion stems from the belief that once 
the Americans became vulnerable to nuclear attack they might 
attempt to reduce the dangers to themselves even at the 
expense of their European allies. (Freedman, 1981, P. 301)
The deterrent in Europe is forged as a combination of 
conventional and nuclear forces. "In hostilities beginning 
with conventional battles, the U.S. would not have too many 
qualms about intervening, yet the act of intervention would 
make future nuclear use more credible, so increasing the 
deterrent.”(Freedman, 1981, P. 297) The difficulty with 
Europe is how to defend it in the face of a Soviet invasion 
without destroying what is trying to be protected. German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt described the role of NATO9s con­
ventional forces in Europe;
In the interests of maintaining the 
substance substance of Europe and 
particularly of Germany, NATO must... 
have troops and weapons on a scale ample 
to make non-nuclear aggression appear 
hopeless, and sufficient in an emergency
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to force one of two courses on the 
aggressor— to halt or extend the con­
flict. (Freedman, 1981, P. 288)
How to defend Europe with NATO forces was, and continues 
to be, as big a question as how many forces and of what type 
should be deployed. Tactical nuclear weapons are only good 
as a first defense. After targets are among the people of 
NATO they are of little use. A defensive wall at the border 
would serve to acknowledge politically the permanence of a 
divided Germany. Also, the memory of the French Maginot Line 
in 1940 proves the flaw in the concept. Weapons at the front 
give nuclear weapons to Germany, which the French are not 
about to tolerate. Lastly, U.S, backed mobile forces moving 
to the front, leaves no "line." Germany fears that it might 
be absorbed by a Soviet advance. (P. 289, Freedman)
French President Charles DeGaulle saw nuclear weapons as 
a way of providing France with a distinctive identity and a 
power base from which to criticize the hegemonic aspirations 
of the United States. Pierre Gallois, the French strategist, 
foresaw the consequences of the nuclear era. He realized 
that those v/ho were denied self-protection had to hope they 
represented a sufficient stake for a superpower protector to 
risk nuclear war for their security. However, no one state 
is assured of remaining on the right side of an atomic "bomb­
line. "(Freedman, 1981, P. 314)
The British did not see an independent nuclear arsenal
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so much as a means toward independence, as they saw it as a 
way to ensure greater political power. In 1958, MacMillan 
stated, "The fact that we have it makes the U.S. pay a 
greater regard to our point of view, and that is of great 
importance."(Freedman, 1981 P. 311) Alec Douglas, MacMil­
lan's successor, called the A-Bomb "a ticket of admission" 
providing a "place at the peace table."(Freedman, 1981, P.
311) The British, by accepting American Polaris submarine 
missiles, were combining allied integration and national 
independence.
Another important reason for a country to want an inde­
pendent nuclear force is that in time of crisis or conflict, 
America and Britain might have a different order of priori­
ties in the selection of targets. This independent target 
selection capability was stressed by Winston Churchill.
(Won -Fraser, 1980, P. 132) However, the British arsenal was 
never meant to be entirely independent. Relevant issues to 
the U.S. and Britain were treated as matters of shared 
responsibility. The British nuclear component of NATO was 
taken for granted. (Freedman, 1981, P. 308)
The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons
Since the end of World War II the political utility of 
nuclear weapons has been the subject of great dispute. As I 
have shown with the cases of the United States and China, the
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perceived effectiveness of nuclear arsenals at achieving 
political and/or military objectives has ranged from tremen­
dous faith on the part of the former in the early post-war 
period, to tremendous skepticism by the latter, I believe the 
truth lies somewhere in between these extremes and differs 
depending on whether one is speaking about relations between 
the Superpowers, or on foreign policy objectives involving 
other countries, although these distinctions are rarely 
absolute.
The Superpowers have confronted several nuclear crises, 
each of which stemmed from conflictual foreign policy objec­
tives involving a third country. Nearly any actively pursued 
aberration in the status-quo realm of political influence by 
one of the Superpowers is bound to disturb the other to some 
extent. Stemming from the post-WWII power redistribution, 
the U.S, began a policy of Soviet containment—  fearing the 
spread of communism. The Soviets however, fearing a third 
invasion of their country in this century, became quite 
concerned about what they perceived to be attempts at Western 
encirclement. Although somewhat of an exaggeration, attempts 
by one of the Superpowers to influence the politics of other 
countries has been viewed as either Capitalistic Imperialism 
or Soviet Expansionism, although the acting country would 
maintain that their actions were aiding democracy or speeding 
the 11 inevitable overthrow of the Bourgeois class11 respec­
tively. My point is that although each is trying to influ­
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ence other countries with the presence of their nuclear 
arsenals, conflicts of interest are common between the Super­
powers and often produce tense situations.
The Berlin Crisis (1959,1961), Cuba Crisis (1962), and 
the Middle East Conflict (1973) provide valuable lessons 
about the political utility of nuclear weapons. In general, 
"Nuclear armaments yield political utility for cautioning (if 
not intimidating) opponents, for eliciting respect from 
allies, for exercising management in crisis, for bargaining 
from positions of evident strength.M(Wong-Fraser, 1980, P. 
336)
The Berlin Crisis demonstrated the abhorrence the United 
States feels about launching an all-out first strike. For in 
1961, the National Intelligence Estimate claimed that the 
U.S.S.R. had only four operational ICBMs. Although Rowen- 
Kaysen proposed a Counter Force first strike, the unstated 
belief was that Berlin was not worth it. If ever in the 
history of the nuclear arms race before or since, one side 
had unquestionable superiority over the other, one side truly 
had the ability to devastate the other sides strategic 
forces, ... the autumn of 1961 was that time. Yet approach­
ing the height of the gravest crisis that had faced the West 
since the onset of the Cold War, everyone said 'No.'
(Kaplan, 1983, P. 301)
Therefore, the obvious conclusion is that if one is 
unable to use a first-strike capability, there is really
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little political utility in having one. Apparently the U.S. 
is not the only country to feel this way. The U.S. in 1977, 
and the Soviets in 1978 claimed that nuclear weapons would 
only be used for the defense of their respective countries or 
for the protection of allies under attack. (Epstein, 1984, P. 
19)
Today the Superpowers have reached a nuclear parity for 
all practical purposes, and I say for all practical purposes 
for a reason. MAD means that, between the Superpowers, a 
small numerical advantage means nothing— either militarily or 
politically. Once a blatant first strike capability was 
unobtainable there could be no superiority that could be 
exploited militarily. It is hard to imagine how serious 
political benefits could flow from an unusable military 
capacity. (Freedman, 1981, P. 360) Henry Kissinger asks, 
"What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is 
the significance of it, politically, militarily, operation­
ally at these levels of numbers? What do you do with 
it?"(Freeman, 1981, P. 363) It should be possible to have 
fair and meaningful arms treaty negotiations while bargaining 
from a position of nuclear inferiority, if one possesses a 
MAD capability. This is yet another challenge to the arms 
race mentality that is currently prevalent.
Of the crises I mentioned, the one that perhaps closest 
represents a direct confrontation between the Superpowers was 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. It has been said that the U.S. and
40
Soviet Union were eyeball to eyeball and the Soviets blinked. 
This may have been the case, but it should not be miscon­
strued as evidence of the political benefits (in regards to 
Superpower relations) of nuclear weapons. Although Khruschev 
may have feared an American nuclear response, from a practi­
cal standpoint, the U.S, had a tremendous conventional advan­
tage in the area that included a working blockade of Soviet 
ships* Those missiles were not going to be allowed in Cuba 
regardless of the American nuclear threat.
Although the political utility of nuclear weapons is 
quite limited in direct confrontations between countries 
possessing a MAD capability, nuclear weapons can prove to be 
a valuable tool in foreign affairs if the threat of their use 
is perceived as being real. Power is the content of a real­
istic foreign policy but it must be coupled with commitment 
(or at least perceived commitment), otherwise it will not be 
credible, nor influential. For non-nuclear countries a 
nuclear threat is more likely to yield political benefits 
because they lack the means to effectively deter the aggres­
sor from carrying out the threat if political concessions are 
not granted. Nonetheless, the threat must still be perceived 
as credible. The Korean War demonstrated that "Unless a 
country was formally committed to nuclear intimidation it 
would not successfully deter an opponent.11 (Wong-Fraser,
1980, P. 278) Dulles' "Roll-Back" policy of 1952 was a 
classic example of U.S. dependence on the deterrent effect of
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its nuclear arsenal as a foreign policy instrument. As 
Dulles said, "The only way to stop prospective aggressors is 
to convince them in advance that if they commit aggression, 
they will be subjected to retaliatory blows so costly that 
their aggression will not be a profitable one."(Wong-Fraser, 
1980, PP. 278-279) "The outbreak of the Korean War cannot be 
used as a proof of the failure of nuclear intimidation. It 
was rather the failure to employ nuclear intimidation which 
caused it."(Wong-Fraser, 1980, P. 272)
Other factors besides a lack of nuclear commitment do 
come into play when one is determining the political utility 
of a nuclear arsenal in foreign affairs. China was directly 
threatened with the prospect of a U.S. nuclear assault on 
their country during the Korean War; however, they were not 
the least deterred from invading North Korea when the U.S. 
forces crossed the 38th Parallel. The reason was that the 
Chinese could not have the American enemy so close to their 
border without fearing for their sovereignty and influence in 
the region. "Nations will not be deterred by the massive 
destructiveness of nuclear weaponry if they feel their 
national security is being threatened."(Wong-Fraser, 1980,
P. 279) Likewise, political pressures upon a nuclear country 
may take away the utility of its nuclear threat. "The use of 
atomic weapons for marginal cases in Korea or Indo-China was 
proved to be unacceptable to the Western Europeans, and 
American global interests ran into conflict with her European
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allies."(Wong-Fraser, 1980, P. 222) Lastly, nuclear weapons 
cannot often be deployed effectively relative to overall 
military objectives. The Israelis cannot use nuclear weapons 
on the Golan for fear of polluting the Kennerit; the Iraquis 
could not use them against Jerusalem without destroying the 
mosques they seek to liberate. The United States could not 
use them in South Vietnam without contaminating the country­
side of our own allies; the Soviets could not use them 
against Prague and Budapest without destroying the industries 
they seek to exploit. (Beitz, 1984, P. Ill)
Political Theorist Douglas Lackey claims that even when 
the U.S. had a large nuclear advantage the effectiveness of 
nuclear threats as a deterrent to Soviet aggression or Commu­
nist expansion was practically non-existent. He supports his 
statement by describing the invasions of Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, the blockade of Berlin, and Chiang Kai-Shek's fall. 
(Beitz, 1984, P. 110) He contends that today's nuclear 
parity yields even less political utility, especially in 
Europe. He attempts to link a possible future invasion of 
West Germany by the Soviets as evidence of how U.S. nuclear 
deterrence would not check Soviet expansionism today. How­
ever, he fails to recognize the varying levels of U.S. com­
mitment to each of those countries. Whereas the level of 
U.S. commitment to Hungary and Czechoslovakia was quite low, 
consisting of primarily verbal support; the Berlin Blockade 
and Chaing Kai-Shek's ouster drew active U.S. intervention,
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but not a nuclear commitment (although threats were made).
The difference with Germany, and the rest of the United 
States close allies in NATO, is that the Soviets recognize 
that a U.S. nuclear commitment exists. Thus, because the 
threat is real, so is the deterrent effect and the political 
utility of nuclear weapons in this instance is also real.
Deterrence Theory
Although I have repeatedly alluded to deterrenco and 
Deterrence Theory, I would now like explain the concept more 
fully because it is the foundation upon which my proposals 
will be based. Clearly, credibility is the key to deter­
rence. Since this theory was developed by John McNamara and 
his men, I believe it should be described in his own words. 
"The very existence of nuclear weapons and an unequivocable 
policy to use them on the battlefield in the event of a large 
invasion were the best guarantees to prevent war from break­
ing out in the first place."(Kaplan, 1983, P. 340) Gallois, 
from France, had a similar viewpoint: If the potential
assailant believed that... the opposing side would not hesi­
tate, rather than surrendur, to use its nuclear arsenal, he 
would have to abandon force a* a means of persuasion. 
(Freedman, 1981, P. 315)
In other words, a policy of assured automatic retalia­
tion yields no provocation, while reluctance/hesitation
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reduces the deterrent effect for future encounters. Deter­
rence is not a new concept, although Deterrence Theory has 
been a product of the Nuclear Age. George Washington told 
Congress in 1790, "To be prepared for war is one of the most 
effectual means of preserving peace."(Halle, 1984, P. 25)
A general truth about weapons is that the greater their 
destructive capabilities, the less certain a deteree has to 
be that they will be used to be deterred. In regards to 
nuclear deterrence, perceived commitment is equally as effec­
tual as actual commitment. In the pre-nuclear age credibil­
ity resulted from past military performances; unlike today, 
where no one except the United States has any performance 
record with nuclear weapons. "Bluffs" are a dangerous prac­
tice, though, because if one fails to respond to a challenge, 
especially likely on smaller objectives, a destabilizing 
situation could develop where the credibility of a true 
commitment is doubted. The threats of Massive Retaliation by 
John Dulles in the 1950s were unrealistic and dangerous 
because they increased the misperceptions that existed 
between the U.S. and Soviets during a time of great tension.
While endeavors that undermine one's credibility dimin­
ish the deterrent effect, unpredictability— although danger­
ous to the stability of relations—  can increase the deter­
rent effect. "That fallible and unpredictable human beings 
might be faced with a choice between no retaliation to attack 
or all-out war in response to attack has been the fundamental
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uncertainty upon which nuclear deterrence has 
depended."(Freedman, 1983, P. 391) Although I believe the 
following suggestion by Andre Beaufre, who wanted several 
centers of nuclear decision-making, could destabilize the 
status-quo too much and inadvertently lead to war; his pro­
posal would undoubtedly have his desired effect. "The 
nuclear threshold has become so stable that it needs to be, 
so to speak destabilised to restore its deterrent 
effect."(Freedman, 1983, P. 318)
The following is an example of a typical nuclear sce­
nario. Its function here is to describe the role of deter­
rence and counterforce in regards to conflicts among the 
Superpowers. In the unlikely event of an all-out war, or 
(more likely) a conventional one that has escalated, the 
aggressor country will target the military forces of the 
other— to knock-out/diminish a retaliatory response and 
protect its own population. The aggressor may or may not 
initially target cities as well, depending on its level of 
commitment to the exchange.
With the aggressor's missiles launched, a quick decision 
faces the other country's leader—  either to launch his 
weapons before they are destroyed, or to accept unilateral 
annihilation. The leader's only active response, and the 
more likely one, is to launch a retaliatory strike and knock­
out the aggressor's secondary strike capability, and/or 
target its cities. If the attacked leader were to opt for
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cities, the aggressor would probably attempt to respond in 
kind. However, he may choose to rely on some assured retali­
atory capability (for instance, SLBHs). Thus, he could hold 
the aggressor's cities "hostage" in order to get a cease­
fire/ treaty. But a leader who has just lost one-half his 
nation may be loath to call a cease-fire without ever having 
retaliated. Thus, in most cases nuclear scenarios end in 
mutual destruction.
For a first-strike, the initial targeting of population 
centers makes no military sense and is morally apprehensible. 
The rationale behind MAD, and the targeting of population 
centers, is only found in a response to a first strike. 
Country 'A' will, by virtue of a first strike, prevent coun­
try 'B' from having the military capability to defeat it; 
however, 'B' retains the retaliatory capability to inflict 
unacceptable damages upon 'A'—  through the destruction of 
cities and deaths of tens of millions of innocent people. 
Thus, the costs of going to war for 'A' are greater than any 
possible advantage 'A' might gain from a military victory. 
Therefore, theoretically, 'A' will be deterred from attacking 
in the first place. Again however, for the HAD deterrent to 
work, three criteria must be met: (1) there must be a commit­
ment, or perceived commitment, on the part of country 'B' to 
retaliate; (2) country 'A' must be aware of this commitment; 
(3) the leader of country 'A' must be rational enough not to 
instigate mutual suicide.
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Benjamin Lambeth ridicules Assured Destruction by claim­
ing that it is the antithesis of strategy, because it fails 
to be useful at the brink of war. (Freedman, 1983, P. 260)
The truth of his statement is undeniable, but this does not 
diminish the utility of MAD as a deterrent. A good defense 
has two parts: 1) A deterrent; 2) The means to save what one 
is trying to protect. For instance the U.S. refuses to 
pledge "no first-use," citing NATOs numerical disadvantage in 
Europe. "For an American public eager for demobilization, 
nuclear threats provided an appealing substitute for foot 
soldiering on foreign soil."(Beitz, 1984, P. 109) The result 
of this inaction is increased deterrence because the Soviets 
know that a conventional attack will be met by nuclear retri­
bution. However, this alone is a poor defense. A conven­
tional defense is also necessary to protect Europe from 
becoming a nuclear battleground. It is similarly correct 
that one "Cannot eliminate the possibility of nuclear war 
simply by assuring that if it occurs it will be an unlimited 
catastrophe."(Freedman, 1983, P. 373) However, one must be 
careful not to accept the usability of nuclear weapons. For 
if they are more usable, they r t mo *e likely to be used. 
Conventional forces are needed stlil for conventional war­
fare.
McNamara's men attempted to calculate the requirements 
for a nuclear deterrent against the Soviets. Basing their 
calculations on limited marginal returns resulting from
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increased megatonnage, they calculated the following: The
Soviets would be sufficiently deterred if we could k;11 30 
percent of their population and destroy half of their indus­
trial capacity, and further, that this task could be accom­
plished with the explosive power of 400 megatons. (Kaplan, 
1983, P. 317)
Actually, McNamara foresaw an assured retaliatory force 
consisting of 1200 megatons—  400 on each leg of the triad. 
Even though 800 megatons would kill only ten percent more 
people than 400 megatons. (Kaplan, 1983, P, 317) In 1973, 
Arnold Schlesinger said that military planning had to assume 
that deterrence might fail, but it was "Not possible to 
forecast the situations that would cause it to 
fail."(Freedman, 1981, P. 379) Contingencies mentioned by 
Schlesinger included: accidental acts? the escalation of 
conventional conflict? a challenge to a nuclear test of 
will3? ill-informed or cornered and desperate leaders; a 
massive surprise attack. (Freedman, 1981, P. 379) Decreas­
ing the likelihood of these contingencies will be of utmost 
importance if meaningful arms reductions are to take place. 
Schlesinger has said that increased emphasis on conventional 
weapons will raise the nuclear threshold causing "... A 
dimunition of the threat of recourse to nuclear weap­
ons. " (Freedman, 1981, P. 386)
In summary, deterrence nay not guarantee peace, but it 
does instill fear. "We are each afraid, very much afraid of
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the other's deterrent, whether or not this is a rational 
fear, and whether it is a fear of a rational strategy, or a 
fear of an enemy's possible suicidal madness.1 (Kennedy,
1985, P. 53) Deterrence is not an end in itself; but in 
current conditions, based on rough nuclear parity, deterrence 
is a step in the direction of progressive arms reductions. 
Throughout this paper thus far, I have provided relevant 
historical background information; now the focus of this 
paper will describe the means by which a peaceful climate can 
be achieved and future actions undertaken. The nuclear 
stalemate has, for the first time in history, made all-out 
war unthinkable. MAD has created the foundation for elimi­
nating eliminating the misperceptions, threats to peace, 
destabilizing factors, proliferation, and arms race that 
threaten the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons. If 
assured destruction can be accompanied by a climate of sta­
bility and clear perceptions, the arms race will not be 
necessary. In other words, one must try to eliminate the 
contingencies that may cause the breakdown of deterrence 
before they occur.
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In his book Why Nations Go to War, John Stoessinger 
claims that misperceptions of reality are the basic causes of 
war. He believes that war is an accident, because on the eve 
of each war, at least one nation misperceives another's 
power. (1982, P. 212) He recognizes four categories of 
misperceptions:
1) A leader's mistaken image of himself 
or his role.
2) Misperceptions of an adversaries 
intentions.
3) Misperceptions of the character of 
the adversary.
4) Misperceptions of the adversary's 
power. (1982, P. 23)
Stoessinger claims that "A leader's misperceptions of 
the adversary's power is perhaps the quintessential cause of 
war.'1 (1982, P. 212) The utility of Stoessinger's Theory lies 
in application to Superpower relations. If the parity of the 
Superpowers is followed by clear perceptions vis-a-vis veri­
fication and improved communications, both sides would real­
ize that there would be no advantage in attacking the other. 
Therefore, if accidental causes of war are eliminated, no 
rational actor would begin such a war.
His theory is flawed however, in several respects. If 
countries are of vastly unequal strengths, accurate
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perceptions of the other's power could very easily lead to a 
first-strike in a conflict or a pre-emptive strike by the 
weaker country. Second, his notion that on the eve of each 
war at least one country misperceives another's power, seems 
to indicate a "it takes two to tangle" mentality, whereby 
both countries are volunteering to fight. Unlike boxers in a 
ring who each think they can win, a nation may be forced to 
enter into war against a vastly superior country in order to 
maintain their very existence. The only other option would 
be to surrender. Third, real conflicts of interests 
and objectives do sometimes exist. Lastly, the case studies 
he uses as evidence for his theory are self-serving. He 
describes any failed military campaign as being based on 
misperceptions. However this in unsatisfactory because it 
negates the influence of chance in deciding military 
encounters. If the Russian winter had not been so harsh, the 
Nazis may have defeated the Soviet Union, despite Hitler's 
misperception of the Soviet resolve. Even if misperceptions 
do not lead to war they damage the faith one country has in 
the other and may fuel the proliferation of arms, both 
vertical and horizontal. "The less one side knows of the 
other's capabilities, plans, and intentions, the more it 
tends to react to possibility rather than
reality."(Shearer, 1984, P. 4) This is especially dangerous 
in times of high tension. As I have shown, nuclear false 
alarms are not at all uncommon. Communications are critical
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in such times, The teletype, or "Hotline" between Washington 
and Moscow was installed after the Cuban Crisis to provide a 
better means of resolving the other country's intentions in a 
time of conflict.
The inability to estimate accurately another country's
power despite NTM, photo-reconnaisance satellites, and spy
planes has resulted in worst case projections of nuclear
arsenals in the past and imaginary missile and bomber gaps
that only destabilized the balance-of-power by speeding the
arms race, "It is important not to threaten a first strike,
and not even to allow misperceptions to arise on the other
side that it might be preparing for a first strike."
(Fischer, 1984, P. 83) Fear of a first strike capability by
an adversary could easily induce a pre-emptive strike in a
crisis. In order to decrease the misperceptions that exist
over nuclear capabilities and adherence to arms treaties,
on-site verification must become a reality. Despite its
problems on-site verification will augment the means of
verification that already exist, thereby decreasing tensions.
Verification is the attempt to make sure that, through
the application of modern intelligence techniques, certain
activities prohibited by a treaty are in fact not taking
place. There exist three realms of on-site verification:
1) fOSI-1) Mildly Intrusive- U.S. black boxes (U.S. 
seismic monitoring stations that radio information to 
U.S. satellites) at Soviet missile or nuclear weapons 
test sites; a U.S. option to challenge inspection in the 
case of ambiguous events, etc.
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2) (OSI-2) Very Intrusive- U.S. personnel outside or at 
Soviet test sites; random inspections at weapons deploy­
ment sites, etc.
3) (OSI-3) Extraordinarily Intrusive- U.S. personnel 
inside certain Soviet factories or at certain military 
sites at all times, etc. (Enders, 1983, P. 198)
I believe that verification somewhere between OSI-2 and 
OSI-3 should be implemented. On-site verification is not 
without precedent. The Antartic Treaty opened all 
installations for inspection by any of the other signee 
countries. In addition, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty (PNET) contains several important precedents for 
verification including: relatively free access to sites
before, during and after explosions; use by the inspecting 
country of its own equipment in the country to be inspected; 
the promise of assistance and freedom from interference; and 
the establishment of a joint consultative committee to 
resolve verification problems and consider proposals for the 
joint development of standardized verification equipment. 
(Shearer, 1984, P. 45) Although this treaty only applies to 
peaceful nuclear explosions under 150 kilotons, it could 
serve as a model for comprehensive verification programs. In 
addition, the recently signed INF treaty provides the most 
current example of on-site verification between the Superpow­
ers and Europe.
There are many uses for on-site verification that are 
not possible with NTM: For instance, biological and chemical
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weapons storage facilities can be checked; individual 
warheads can be counted and suspected unauthorized sites and 
facilities can be checked; make sure medium-range ss-20s have 
not been converted to intercontinental use— by giving smaller 
or fewer warheads; SALT II limits ICBM launchers to one 
missile each and one cannot store other missiles on the site. 
(Shearer, 1984, P. 28) Although on-site verification can 
never catch all infractions, increasing the riskiness of 
cheating—  by making the infraction susceptible to interna­
tional reaction—  would increase confidence in compliance 
while also serving to deter cheaters.
As I mentioned however, there are some obstacles in the 
way of accurate on-site verification. Not the least of which 
is the "closedness" of the Soviet society despite Glasnost 
and the improved, yet not entirely satisfactory, verification 
terms that are included in the INF treaty. In addition, the 
Soviets already have great access/monitoring capability of 
U.S. military activities through a myriad of open sources 
including: Defense Department annual reports, Congressional 
hearings and reports, the media, professional journals—  
Aviation Week, public speeches, etc. (Shearer, 1984, P. 6) In 
other words, the Soviets do not want nor particularly need 
on-site verification. There are also several problems with 
ensuring the compliance to treaties with someone not trusted, 
regardless of whether or not on-site verification takes 
place. "No agreement requires a party to demonstrate com­
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pliance; rather, what is required is the ability to refute a 
charge of noncompliance to the satisfaction of the side 
making the charge."(Carnesale, 1987, P. 304) Also, the 
verification of banned activities requires evidence that they 
are not occurring anywhere. This is difficult to ensure 
because deliberate violations will be concealed. Exact 
measurements are needed to verify small violations of politi­
cal significance. In addition, on-site verification requires 
reciprocal measures and joint operations that involve many 
details. (Shearer, 1984, P. 16) Another consideration that 
stems from the discussion of verification is the destabiliz­
ing effect confirmed treaty violations would have on Super­
power relations.
Soviet violations of arms control 
agreements could create new security 
risks... because of the military 
consequences of known violations, and 
indirectly by inducing suspicion about 
the existence of undetected violations 
that might have additional military 
consequences. (Carnesale, 1987, P. 303)
Despite the problems associated with on-site 
verification, there are ways to limit the intrusion and 
maximize the verifiability of arms treaties. An 
international inspecting body would help diminish the 
objections raised by having one's adversary in one's own 
facilities. An accurate count on weapons produced and 
weapons destroyed does away with the need for storage and
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deployment controls, thereby limiting the degree of 
intrusiveness necessary to ensure compliance. Lastly, 
unscheduled inspections are important because scheduling 
restrictions and limited access defeat the purpose of the 
visit. However, they should be limited in their number so 
that the do not become obstructive.
Diminish Threats to Peace
After misperceptions are diminished, the threats to 
peace can be diminished as well. The most obvious threat of 
crossing the nuclear threshold comes from a conventional war 
that escalates in intensity. Other, equally dangerous, 
threats to peace are defensive weapons and inadequate warning 
time in the face of a nuclear attack.
Ideally, the best way to avoid crossing the nuclear 
threshold is to avoid conventional war altogether. Short of 
this, strong and credible conventional forces are needed to 
deter a conventional attack. Strong conventional forces also 
provide a nuclear country's leadership with an option besides 
nuclear retaliation or surrender. To decrease the likelihood 
of someone mistakenly or purposely escalating a conventional 
confrontation to a nuclear level, two safeguards are 
recommended. One, no one person, not even a country's 
leader, should single-handedly be able to launch nuclear 
missiles. This decision should require the concurrence of
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several individuals. Similarly to ICBM silos, several keys 
should have to be simultaneously employed to start a nuclear 
war. If this safety measure is good enough for one missile, 
it should definitely be required before a country commits to 
a nuclear assault. Second, multiple individuals (such as 
field commanders) should not have the authority to cross the 
nuclear threshold. The decision to launch nuclear weapons 
must lie with the individual or individuals who have access 
to the most information. In other words, centralization of 
authority should not be delegated to those whose perceptions 
of reality may be incorrect.
I can see several evils deriving from the development 
and deployment of defensive weaponry, without perceiving many 
of the supposed benefits our leaders claim from them. I will 
discuss each of these in depth. (1) Although research on SDI 
will provide technological developments that may be useful in 
other areas, the developments may yield a new technology that 
is so powerful in its implications that it may disrupt the 
balance-of-power between the Superpowers and increase the 
likelihood of war. (2) In addition, defensive weapons have 
historically proven to be vulnerable, costly, and 
contributors to the arms race. (3) Also, defensive weapons 
are destabilizing; they do not stabilize international 
relations, nor do they make the country safer for having 
them. For these reasons, Reagan's SDI is as big a mistake 
today, as ABMs were in the past and its development should be
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halted,
Now if every major country had itj own nuclear shield 
there would be no problem, in fact this would be an ideal 
situation. Unfortunately, not everyone is going to get a 
shield at the same time. Therefore the as-yet unshielded 
countries would have to rely on the good intentions of the 
shielded ones. Ever, if this were a viable possibility, I am 
not sure if the current international situation would risk 
it.
Maxum 835 in the Pubilius Syrus of 1 B.C., said that "It 
is vain to look for a defense against lightning."(Mayers,
1984, P. 59) Although this statement was not made with 
nuclear weapons in mind, it is apropos. This does not mean 
however, that in military and political discussions, ration­
ality always prevails over vanity. In fact, ever since the 
development of the atomic bomb, countries have sought a means 
to defend themselves against it. If successful, nuclear 
nuclear blackmail and non-deterrable first-strike capability 
will become political realities for the shielded country, 
with the corresponding reality of a desperate, pre-emptive 
strike becoming more likely for any unprotected adversaries.
In the past, nuclear defense systems have taken 
primarily four forms:
1) Interceptor Aircraft- Equipped with nuclear and 
non-nuclear missiles to intercept attacking bombers.
2) Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs)- Nuclear and 
non-nuclear missiles launched from land and surface ships
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against bombers and cruise missiles.
3) Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces (ASW)- Ships, aircraft, 
and submarines used to detect and destroy enemy subma­
rines.
4) Anti-Ballistic Missiles fABMs)- To destroy incoming 
defensive missiles. (Mayers, 1984, P. 59)
A related, albeit non-nuclear, threat to defense is 
Anti-Satellite weaponry. Prototypes of ASATs were tested as 
early as 1959, but they did not become operational until 
1964. The Air Force maintained nuclear tipped Thor missiles, 
stationed on Johnston Island from 1964-1970. (Carnesale,
1987, P. 139) The Soviets were unwilling to dismantle their 
orbiting ASAT system, even for a U.S. promise not to build a 
more advanced direct ascent Miniature Homing Vehicle (MV) 
that would be launched from aircraft. Carter wanted to ban 
all ASAT weapons in 1976, but the Soviets wanted to limit, 
not ban, these weapons. They also wanted to link the Space 
Shuttle in negotiations. (Carnesale, 1987, P» 145) These 
negotiations ultimately ended in failure. "The prospect of 
an enhanced Soviet ASAT was especially worrisome because of 
the growing U.S. military dependence on satellites.**(Shearer, 
1984, P. 141) ASATs were dangerous because they had the 
capability of disrupting communications that would ensure a 
retaliatory response. Thus, their existence and workability 
increase the likelihood of war by increasing the likelihood 
that a first strike would not result in mutual destruction.
In addition, as all defensive weapons, ASATs contribute to
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the Anns Race. "Any possibility of sanctuary from attack 
will probably encourage the Superpowers to place more and 
more threatening satellites in space."(Shearer, 1984, P. 152)
Although ASAT prohibitions failed, ABNs were 
successfully banned. The ABM was terribly vulnerable to a 
number of counter-measures that the Soviets could quite 
easily and cheaply prepare. For instance, saturation, 
multiple warheads radar black-outs, and decoys could all put 
an ABM in jeopardy. ABMs should have been deployed to safe­
guard the U.S. retaliatory response, by surrounding Minutemen 
silos, not U.S. cities.
The ABM Treaty saved $711 Million in 1973 by cancelling 
their construction and deployment. (Shearer, 1984, P. 86) 
Prior to the signing of the treaty, the U.S. estimated that 
the Soviet Union might deploy as many as 10,000 ABM intercep­
tor missiles. The treaty, with 1974 modifications, set the 
limit at 100— with only one site allowed. Later, all ABMs 
were eliminated, except those around Moscow that provide the 
Soviet equivalent of Air Force 1; they safeguard the leader­
ship in order to ensure a retaliatory capability. More 
important than the monetary savings the treaty produced, was 
the stabilizing effect of the treaty. The elimination of 
this type of defensive weapon ensured that missiles that 
survived a first strike would reach their targets. Thus, by 
eliminating a defensive weapon that automatically brought 
about an offensive build-up, deterrence was enhanced by
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ensuring assured destruction and the Superpowers found them­
selves safer without them*
Unfortunately, this lesson was short lived as attempts 
at a perfect defense via SDI became realistic enough to 
pursue in the 1980s. Reagan's "Star Wars" plan is perhaps 
the most strategically incomprehensible program ever adopted. 
It will most likely not work effectively, as recent tests 
have demonstrated, but even if it does work completely it 
will still be a no-win proposition with potentially catas­
trophic consequences.
In support of SDI Reagan said, "Would it not be better 
to save lives than to avenge them."(Fischer, 1984, P. 72)
This is undeniably a noble goal, but it is practically flawed 
by the inherent limitations of SDI. Reagan wants a gradual 
evolution toward a defense dominated world, with nuclear 
weapons being rendered impotent and obsolete, but this is not 
possible at this time.
Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said, "American 
political and military leaders should publicly acknowledge 
that there is no realistic prospect for a successful 
population defense, certainly for many decades, and probably 
never."(Snow, 1987, P. 51) Physicists and weapons scientists 
reached the conclusion that a complete defense of the general 
public against Soviet missiles was not practicacable. "Even 
had a 'leakproof umbrella' against ICBMs been a possibility, 
this could not defend the American population against cruise
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missiles launched from submarines off its coast."(Kennedy, 
1985, P. 100)
The reasons these individuals are skeptical of SDI stems 
from the technological challenge it presents, the cost and 
especially its vulnerability. It has been estimated that the 
computer program for SDI will require from 10 to 30 million 
lines. The cost may be in access of one trillion dollars.
But the primary concern is over vulnerability. SDI may be 
penetrated by (1) cruise missiles, (2) bomber aircraft, (3) 
and the clandestine introduction of warheads. (Snow, 1987, P. 
50)
Let us presume however, that somehow all of these
obstacles are overcome and SDI provides a complete nuclear
umbrella for the United States. What are the implications
for peace? Retargeting incentives of defensive systems make
civilian populations vulnerable.
One side's possession of an effective defensive system 
makes the other side's missiles relatively less attrac­
tive targets— since they can probably be destroyed once 
fired, if necessary, they need not be attacked on the 
ground. (Wasserstrom, 1985, P. 388)
As a result, cities are targeted and the defense system 
can be relied upon to protect against retaliation. This 
increases the temptation to launch a first strike and make 
Dulles-like threats of Massive Retaliation. Another consid­
eration is that the side that lacks a defense system will be 
forced to target virtually all of its missiles on an oppo­
nents population centers to insure enough retaliatory damage
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to deter attack by its defended opponent. (Wasserstrom, 1985, 
P. 389) Now, Reagan has offered to share SDI technology with 
the Soviets after the system has been perfected. Needless to 
say, the Soviets are not very willing to trust that the U.S. 
will provide a technological hand-out. The idea that the 
U.S. will voluntarily relinquish a military advantage that 
cost them a trillion dollars to research and develop, and 
that effectively provides them with a first strike capability 
is not one that the Soviets will accept without reservation.
Indeed, Soviet fears about SDI are already apparent. 
"What is clear is that the disagreement about SDI stands as a 
major— possibly the major— impediment to improving the polit­
ical and strategic relationship between the Superpow­
ers." (Snow, 1987, P. 82) Many of the Soviet fears are well- 
grounded, while others reflect worst-case scenario projec­
tions of the future that reflect the misperceptions that 
still exist between our two countries. That the Soviets are 
uncertain of our ambitions is quite evident and quite danger­
ous for peaceful relations. (1) They believe that SDI is 
part of a U.S. plan to oain strategic superiority. From a 
1984 Soviet defense document comes this statement:
Washington is pursuing two objectives. The first is to 
create a comprehensive (total) land and space-based ABM 
system... The second goal is to simultaneously build up 
strategic offensive armaments clearly aimed at acquiring 
a first-strike capability. (Snow, 1987, P. 73)
Soviet public sources have claimed that SDI is intended
for offensive, not defensive purposes:
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Since 1981, on personal instructions of President Reagan, 
these matters have been repeatedly discussed... to select 
the most promising ways of developing effective weapons 
for destroying targets in outer space and targets in the 
atmosphere and on Earth from outer space. (Snow, 1987, P. 
47)
(2) The Soviets have similar technological aspirations
that they fear the United States may realize first. Secretary
of State, George Schultz, said that the worst Soviet fear was
that "A major American antiballistic missile system could
give the United Staten a possible first-strike
capability..."(Snow, 1987, P. 74) (3) The major promise of
SDI is control of access to space. Konstantin Chernenko made
the following proclamation in 1984:
If the militarization of outer space is not reliably 
blocked, it will erase everything that has been achieved 
in the area of arms limitations... and dramatically 
increase the danger of nuclear war. (Snow, 1987, P. 75)
(4) The Soviets don't fear SDI itself, but the other
weapons its research will produce.
The keys to the success or failure of SDI are the 
technologies of target acquisition, tracking and point­
ing, and command and control. Sensors, computers, and 
highly engineered electro-mechanical subsystems— products 
of electronics and miniaturization— are the linchpins of 
SDI. (Snow, 1987, P. 76)
(5) SDI will stimulate the U.S. technological base and 
thereby accentuate the gap between the U.S. and Soviet 
technological bases. Gorbachev is on record as saying, 
"Venturing on its own arms race in space (the United States) 
is now hoping to outstrip us in electronics and comput­
ers. "(Snow, 1987, P. 77)
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The problem with evaluating the legitimacy of these 
concerns is that two unknowns are missing. First, if the 
stated intentions of the U.S. are not accurate, or if the 
Soviets are not conveying their true concerns, they are the 
only ones who know for sure. But neither can be certain of 
the position of the other. Second, no one knows if, or to 
what extent, SDI will work. The first claim suggests that 
the U.S. is trying to acquire a first-strike capability.
This is possible, but SLBMs will not be affected by any SDI 
shield and the Soviets understand this. Thus, the claim may 
be accurate but relatively unimportant in regards to the 
nuclear stalemate. Clearly, the technological benefits 
deriving from SDI will be immense, so the second and fifth 
claims may be well-grounded. However, the third and four 
complaints are less so. The fact that the U.S. cannot cur­
rently put a ship into orbit should be evidence enough that 
it is not about to control access to space. Concerns over 
controlled access to space and space weaponry are probably 
more the subjects of propaganda and paranoia then fact.
Thus far, this discussion has only discussed the 
implications of SDI success or failure. I have attempted to 
show that either outcome is potentially dangerous for the 
maintenance of peace. It is also possible that SDI will be 
partially functional. A so-called Less Than Perfect (LTP) 
defense does not provide any rationale for deployment either. 
As has been demonstrated by the ABMs, "The deployment of
6 6
defensive weapons can accelerate the arms race just as much 
as the deployment of offensive weapons."(Freedman, 1981, p. 
363) The inutility of a LTP defense system can be recognized 
when one considers that "The cumulative protective effect for 
civilians of both sides having 90 percent effective anti­
missile defense systems would be much less than that provided 
by a 90 percent reduction of missiles on both sides (with 
defenses foregone)(Wasserstrom, 1985, P. 389)
Promoting Stability
After one has diminished the threats to peace it becomes 
possible to build upon a relaxed atmosphere by promoting 
stability— both political and military. These are not 
distinct categories however. Whenever a major interest is 
threatened by nuclear weapons, a dangerous political 
situation is created. Any radical changes in military or 
political policy can produce an equally radical response, in 
other words, the current power structure or status-quo 
between nuclear powers should be maintained as closely as 
possible. Changes in power relationships are inevitable, but 
they must occur slowly to ensure a stable transitional 
period.
From clearer perceptions of another country's capabili­
ties and motivations regarding a shared political or military 
objective comes an increased trust in the other country,
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which when coupled with verification, provides the groundwork 
for alleviating the worst-case planning that is prevalent 
among both U.S. and Soviet military planners. "Preparing for 
the worst means having something more than parity. Both sides 
preparing for the worst can only fuel the arms 
race."(Shearer, 1984, P. 5) Now is an ideal time to promote 
stability because the United States and Soviet Union enjoy 
relative parity. Verification is crucial because it provides 
reassurance that neither side is attempting to gain an advan­
tage. In addition, verification reassures the verifying 
country that it may trust the other country to uphold its 
agreements. Trust cannot initially be taken too far when the 
future of the world is at stake. Besides reassurance, veri­
fication procedures that allow for accurate warhead counts 
would remove many of the incentives to deploy highly MIRVed, 
destabilizing systems. "To the extent that uncertainty 
sparks worst-case planning, anticipatory reaction, preemption 
and crisis decision-making, nuclear ambiguity might lead 
itself more easily to dangerous escalation,"(Kincade, 1982,
P. 148)
A totally unnecessary, dangerous development is the 
reduction of warning time by deploying ballistic missiles 
closer to their target, on submarines or on land (e.g., in 
Europe)• This has increased the danger of accidental nuclear 
war by shortening the time in which an opponent can identify 
a false warning as an error, or judge the scale of an attack
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and respond accordingly.
Once worst-case planning becomes unnecessary the logical
step toward increasing stability is to create treaties thet
help solidify peaceful relations and dissipate hostilities.
This idea is not without historical precedent.
With the conclusion of the SALT I 
agreements, each side knew the range of 
strategic alternatives available to the 
other side, and for the first time could 
discount its worst fears about the 
other's future deployments. (P. 82,
Carnesale)
The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) is evidence of how an 
arms limitation agreement can reduce tensions on both sides, 
Kennedy's Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the possible 
political advantage resulting from a decrease in tensions 
outweighed any possible military disadvantages the treaty 
might have. (Carnesale, 1987, P. 14) An in-depth content 
analysis of Soviet statements six months prior to as well as 
after the signing of the LTBT points out that from the Soviet 
side a visible lessoning of hostility had taken place. 
(Carnesale, 1987, P. 16) In addition, in absence of the 
treaty, technological breakthroughs might lead to a signifi­
cantly destabilizing situation.
Controlling Proliferation
Although a rough parity exists between the Superpowers 
and a balance-of-power exists between the East and West,
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horizontal nuclear proliferation can be very destabilizing in 
the near future if it is not controlled by the supplier 
states. History has shown that some proliferation is 
inevitable. But the rate of proliferation must be controlled 
so that regional balance-of-powers are not upset by the 
introduction of nuclear weapons. In addition, supplier 
countries must not aid states who are likely to employ 
nuclear weapons offensively instead of using them as a 
defensive deterrent to attack. Only in this way can a 
minimum deterrent capability be achieved that does not 
destabilize the status-quo either in its implementation or 
actualization. Otherwise, "Nuclear proliferation is far more 
likely to hurt than to help international stability. One can 
oppose proliferation without being either elitist or racist. 
One hould oppose it because it is dangerous.M(Harvard Group, 
1983, P. 217) A past attempt at slowing the rate of prolif­
eration through the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 has been 
of some benefit. Even though not all potential nuclear 
countries signed the treaty, "The NPT has helped to build 
confidence and a degree of predictability in states' behav­
ior ." (Carnesale, 1987, P. 165)
The issue of proliferation is exceedingly involved for 
everyone; the Superpowers, current nuclear powers, potential 
and non-proliferators. In a (somewhat large) nutshell, the 
Superpowers do not want to relinquish their nuclear dominance 
to vertically proliferating, nuclear nations. Nor do they
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want the balance-of-pow.ar to be shifted (at least not against 
them). The nuclear nations do not want to be subject to the 
nuclear threats of the Superpowers? however, they are not yet 
willing/able to develop into a superpower themselves. The 
potential proliterators who see it in their inter- 
est/capability to develop some sort of nuclear capability 
want to safeguard their national securities by deterrence, 
and they want the political clout that accompanies membership 
in the Mnuclear family." Non-nuclear states can in fact be 
divided into three categories: those that regard themselves
as adequately protected? those likely to find themselves 
increasingly isolated internationally as time pass* s? and 
those countries which may be motivated to acquire a political 
symbol if not an operational capability. (Wong-Fraser, 1980, 
P. 339) "Those in the second category (i.e. Israel, South 
Africa, Taiwan) are the most likely to go nuclear. They need 
an equalizer equaliser to offset unfavorable military situa­
tions. " (Wong-Fraser , 1980, P. 340)
I will attempt to demonstrate that horizontal prolifer­
ation is not necessarily a bad thing, if it can be managed.
I also believe that it is inevitable.
If the existing nuclear states proclaim 
and justify their acquisition and 
continued possession of nuclear weapons 
as a deterrent against any attack 
(conventional as well as nuclear), is it 
not inevitable that others should seek to 
emulate them? (P. 299, Wong-Fraser)
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Therefore, the nuclear powers should work with the 
non-nuclear ones to limit the amount of nuclear arms the 
proliferators feel is necessary for their national security.
A stable international relationship could cause the 
proliferating countries to accept a minimal deterrent 
capability, while others may find it unnecessary to 
proliferate at all. A cessation of the arms race is a 
prerequisite for alleviating the fears of potential 
proliferators.
If the provisions of the Baruch Plan had been adopted, 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons would have been 
prohibited; no nuclear weapons could have been nationally 
held; and peaceful nuclear weapons would be under 
International Authority. Mon-nuclear countries would have 
had no reason for going nuclear. However, the provisions are 
less likely to be adopted today then when they were put forth 
in 1946 because of the sheer numbers of nuclear arms and the 
various commitments to nuclear defense that have evolved.
A double standard applies where nuclear weapons are 
concerned. It has been described as the Nth problem. Any 
country with nuclear weapons views the weapons as fully 
justified, however it would probably see any N+lth power as a 
threat to world peace. (Freedman, 1981, P. 303) Although 
there exists a political utility in the possession of nuclear 
weapons, mere possession is all that is required for this 
utility. A large arsenal is not necessary; indeed the costs
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of such an arsenal could be devastating to the country's 
economy. In addition, the other world powers do not have the 
resources to match the Superpowers arsenals. This is should 
not be a problem for proliferating countries—  a minimal 
deterrent capability is all that is required for their 
defense. The ability to prevent an attack is the only moral 
justification for acquiring a nuclear arsenal. Additional 
weapons are not additionally beneficial; they are merely a 
financial burden.
It is necessary however, for countries to feel that they 
have the capability to defend their national boundaries.
This ability should be encouraged, not repressed. But it 
must occur slowly so as to not be destabilizing. Thus, 
nuclear countries should not try to "buy off" another 
country's nuclear option. Israel and Pakistan are examples 
of countries that have clearly been trying hard to sell their 
nuclear capability for political gains. "Hawk" SAMs were 
sold to Israel in 1963. In 1977, 110 A-7 fighter-bombers 
were sold to Pakistan, and in 1979 Carter offered them F-5 
jet fighters. (Kincade, 1982, P. 150) The intent of these 
endeavors was to dissuade these countries from feeling the 
need to go nuclear; however, Israel now has a nuclear arsenal 
and Pakistan is suspected to be developing one. In other 
words, the Superpowers should not make the nuclear option too 
attractive because incentives to proliferate may outweigh any 
disincentives, and when the pay-offs stop, the nuclear option
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remains.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 is significant both 
for what it does and does not accomplish. The treaty has six 
articles that are roughly analogous to the terms of the 
Baruch Plan.
1. The haves do not aid development of 
nuclear weapons for have-nots.
2. The have-nots forego such develop­
ment.
3. The have-nots put peaceful nuclear 
facilities under international safe­
guards.
4. Have-nots have access to peaceful 
technology.
5. Have-nots have access to benefits of 
peaceful nuclear explosions.
6. The haves Pledge to reverse the arms
rase i
Unfortunately, the failure of the sixth provision has 
cancelled out any possible benefits deriving from the first 
five. Understandably, the have-nots are not willing to 
acquiesce to these limitations on their autonomy if the 
Superpowers are not going to uphold their commitment. The 
treaty was not signed by France and China because they felt 
behind in nuclear testing and nuclear production. It was 
also not signed by many, then potential, nuclear countries 
including: Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South
Africa, and Spain. Limited applicability aside, the treaty 
still has value. It serves as a symbol— setting forth the
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goals of the non-proliferation process. It obligates 
countries that would otherwise not be bound to open their 
nuclear operations to International Atomic Energy (IAEA) 
safeguards. It reduces fears. Signed by 102 countries, 
committing several potential nuclear countries to not cross 
the nuclear firebreak, it relieves certain neighbors' fears 
that could lead to nuclear armament. (Kincade, 1982, P. 198) 
The Germans and Japanese are interesting to discuss in 
terms of proliferation because each has the capability of 
gaining a tremendous nuclear arsenal, yet neither has showed 
an inclination to do so. Although they were willing, the 
whole of world sentiment is against the Germans having an 
independent nuclear arsenal, especially twice burned France 
and the Soviet Union. Japan, on the other hand, is rela­
tively content to remain under the United States nuclear 
umbrella. However, they have recently sought their own 
nuclear power facilities. Their negative attitude toward a 
deferee build-up is assuredly a by-product of their equally 
negative experience with nuclear weapons in World War II. 
However, they are accruing an additional benefit from not 
going nuclear. The money they are not spending on defense 
has allowed their economy to flourish, perhaps foregoing a 
military war with the U.S. for an economic one. "Although 
the Germans and Japanese may not have clear plans to develop 
nuclear weapons... their adherence to the NPT has helped 
solidify anti-nuclear attitudes in both coun­
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tries."(Carnesale, 1987, P. 186)
The failure of the Superpowers to obey the preamble and 
sixth provisions of the NPT has caused the non-nuclear 
signees to call for a new treaty. Alva Myrdal, the Swedish 
disarmament negotiator who was instrumental in drafting the 
treaty, was moved in 1976 to observe that "The NPT is now in 
much disrespect and its practices in great disar­
ray ."(Kincade, 1982, P. 197) In 1980 the Second Review 
Conference on NPT was held. "It ended without the adoption 
of any substantive final declaration or even formal reaffir­
mation of the importance of an support for the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty."(Epstein, 1984, P. 51) The non-nuclear 
countries were already peeved by the upward spiralling arms 
race and the lack of a comprehensive test ban, but the U.S. 
decision not to resume trilateral negotiations for a compre­
hensive test ban in 1982 clearly demonstrated the lack of 
resolve on the part of the nuclear signees to uphold their 
obligations.
It would appear that preventing proliferation would be 
in the best interests of the United States; however, they 
consistently vote against any test ban agreements, while the 
Soviet Union has often favored a comprehensive test ban. One 
interesting theory that explains this apparent paradox is 
that the United States favors proliferation. Professor 
Robert Strausz-Hupe believed "... That because the Soviet 
Union distrusted its satellites and did not want them to go
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nuclear, the United States might benefit if some of its 
allies got nuclear weapons.M(Carnesale, 1987, P. 174) Indeed 
the Soviet example of withdrawing nuclear cooperation from 
China in 1959 and the attempts by the United States at a 
Multilateral Force (MLF) involving Germany in 1963, each lend 
credence to his assertion. McNamara stated that rather than 
resist the tide of proliferation it could be harnessed 
through MLF. (Freedman, 1981, P. 328)
I will now digress briefly and describe some of the 
reasons countries have for going nuclear, then I will 
describe how their proliferation can be managed. There are 
basically two types of proliferators: "Garrison1 or "pariah" 
states like Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, and South 
Korea—  which have aggravated security problems, and 
"prestige" states (India, Brazil, Argentina) that are the 
most advanced among Third World countries. (Kincade, 1982, P. 
36) As previously mentioned, garrison states have the great­
est causation for proliferating. The level of indigenous 
nuclear development achieved in each garrison state is 
directly related to (1) the degree of international isolation 
and vulnerability; (2) the duration of the garrison situa­
tion. The longer the garrison situation exists, the more 
independent and sophisticated their nuclear weaponry becomes. 
(Kincade, 1982, P. 95) The U.S. must try to reduce garrison 
tensions in order prevent a nuclear "domino-effect" in their 
respective regions. Another reason nuclear weapons provide
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an attractive option for some garrison states is that they 
ease the burden on defense. For instance, Israel spends a 
large percentage of its GNP on defense. Nuclear weapons 
provide "More bang for the buck," defense with fewer men, and 
security at a lower cost.
The spread of proliferation can best be managed by a 
combination of four means: (1) supplier guidelines; (2) IAEA
verification; (3) sanctions against proliterators; (4) the 
establishment of nuclear free zones. The spread of 
proliferation has been slowed by the Third World's reliance 
on Western supplies of enriched uranium, heavy water and 
reprocessing plants. "India is under strong pressure from 
both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to accept full-scope 
safeguards and its nuclear programme is in the doldrums 
through dependence on the U.S.S.R. for heavy water and the 
U.S. for enriched Uranium."(Kincade, 1982, P. 39) In other 
words, many of the have-nots lack the technology to go 
nuclear. In the past however, suppliers have been more than 
willing to aid a would be proliferator in the name of profit. 
Indeed the spread of proliferation is regularly traceable to 
Western suppliers.
Pr?literation's Spread;
India- U.S. "heavy water," Canadian 
research reactor.
Pakistan and South Korea- France sent 
sensitive nuclear facilities 
Brazil- Germany sent reactors, enrichment 
plants, and reprocessing plants.
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Argentina- Threatened by German/Brazil 
deal, stepped up own development 
of sensitive nuclear facilities.
Japan- U.S. gave permission for a 
reprocessing plant. (P. 179, Carnesale)
The London Suppliers Guidelines (1976), signed by 17 
nations including the U.S., Britain, China, Soviet Union, 
Canada, France, West Germany and Italy, provide excellent 
restrictions for recipients. Recipients (1) cannot use 
nuclear equipment for weapons; (2) must accept IAEA 
safeguards; (3) cannot re-export to third parties unless 
under same terms; (4) must provide adequate safeguards 
against theft or sabotage. Supplier policies must be 
consistent, as must regulations; but, each recipient has 
unique circumstances that must be treated on an individual 
basis (with regards to its ambitions, motivations, 
capabilities, etc.). “Each decision affecting the 
development of nuclear power is made within a particular 
security context and with a particular set of energy policy 
objectives in mind. Therefore, solutions cannot be 
legislated across the board.1 (Kincade, 1982, P. 227)
The IAEA inspectors do not have unlimited access during 
their inspections, and IAEA safeguards are not designed or 
intended to search for undeclared or clandestine facilities, 
but they have been successful nonetheless. "The IAEA inspec­
tion iiystem, although far from perfect, seems good enough to 
have deterred countries from using civil nuclear energy
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programs to advance their military programs. " (Carnesale,
1987, P. 187) It is a monitoring group, not a police force.
Sanctions against countries that do not follow the 
guidelines set forth by the suppliers, or do not accept 
minimal deterrence as a limit to their proliferation, may 
help curb their behavior. In addition, sanctions avoid 
frequently futile political and military attempts at 
buying-off a country's proliferation option. Allow 
proliferation, but only if guidelines and restrict ions 
adhered.
While sanctions cannot be absolute (since 
other diplomatic interests will persist), 
they can be used to show that prolifer­
ation is costly and to deter further 
steps up the proliferation staircase.
(Harvard Group, 1983, P. 231)
Many nuclear yes/no questions are answered by a ecu 
try's national security and the affect nuclear arms would 
have on regional interests. The establishment of nuclear 
free zones would allow entire regions to be relatively secure 
in their conventional defenses, and the fact that an enemy 
has not gone nuclear may eliminate the incentive for a coun­
try to go nuclear. In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco estab­
lished a no-nuclear policy for Latin America. Unfortunately, 
Brazil (being a potential nuclear power) did not sign. The 
problem with nuclear-free zones is that they are most likely 
to be adopted where the threat of proliferation is the least. 
Nuclear countries or "nuclear ambitious" countries lack
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incentives to sign. As a result, regions with high techno­
logical abilities may experience a nuclear "domino effect" 
when the other countries try to "keep up with the Joneses." 
Nonetheless, "Diplomacy at the regional level deserves spe­
cial effort, since that is the level where incentives and 
disincentives are strongest."(Harvard Group, 1983, P. 230)
Establishing and Accepting Parity
Establishing parity is the last step toward creating the 
peaceful climate in Superpower relations that will facilitate 
an arms freeze and eventual arms reductions. Right now a 
nuclear stalemate exists that effectively prevents either 
country from attacking the other. "The nuclear stalemate 
remains in place. It will take a truly revolutionary 
technological innovation or a massive exercise of human 
stupidity before this stalemate is seriously threat­
ened. "(Snow, 1987, P. 128) However, this does not stop the 
Superpowers from trying to break the stalemate. Insecurity 
exists in ths minds of those in power, who recognize the 
inevitability of parity, yet refuse to accept it. Fortu­
nately, reducing misperceptions, reducing the threats to 
peace, and promoting stability provide a basis for the accep­
tance of parity. A revised version of Reagan's 
START/"Build-down" program is a logical means to translate a 
nuclear stalemate into parity because it reduces the advan­
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tages that each country possesses over the other. But the 
arms race must be halted first.
The arms race today is a futile waste of money and 
resources. Overkill is worthless, whether in terms of number 
of warheads— where the U.S. possesses an advantage, or in 
nuclear throw-weight— where the Soviets lead. For instance, 
the 60 Megaton bomb the Soviets tested in 1961 would not have 
much greater damage capability than a 5-10 Megaton bomb. 
(Mayers, 1984, P. 34)
Paul Warnke, the Chief SALT II negotiator for the Carter
Administration stated:
In previous eras, great powers could 
continue to arm and consider themselves 
to be stronger and more secure. As the 
nuclear arms race developed, both the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
recognized that this simple principle no 
longer necessarily applies. The more 
each side armed with nuclear weapons, the 
less secure each might become. (Mayers,
1984, P.88)
Both the United States and Soviet Union have long recog­
nized the inevitability of parity. Nixon and Kissinger 
foresaw that parity would one day exist. Thus, through a 
policy of detente, they attempted to lessen the high level of 
tensions that existed between the two countries. Leonid 
Brezhnev in 1978 made the following statement of the Soviet 
position:
As for the Soviet Union, it considers 
that approximate equilibrium and parity 
are enough for defense needs. Me do not
82
set ourselves the goal of gaining 
military superiority. We also know that 
this very concept loses its meaning with 
the present enormous stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons and systems for their 
delivery. (Mayers, 1984, P. 18)
Although complete parity, with diminished
misperceptions, will grea’ly facilitate the arms
negotiation/treaty-making process, the benefits deriving from
approximate parity are already being felt. "The evidence
suggests that negotiation of SALT II was possible because
neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union appeared to have
absolute strategic superiority. Rather, a condition of
asymmetrical parity existed."(Carnesale, 1987, P. 131)
The difficulty in determining parity is that the forces
of the U.S. and Soviet Union are indeed asymmetrical. This
is however, a technical matter and is not insurmountable.
Approximate equivalency can be determined. In general, most
experts agree that the U.S. leads in number of warheads; the
Soviet Union in megatonnage. In addition, the U.S. leads in
long-range bombers, cruise missiles, missile accuracy, and
has better submarine-launched ballistic missiles and missile
carrying submarines. These experts also agree that the
Soviet Union leads in number of land and sea-based missiles,
the lifting power (or throw-weight) of those missiles, the
explosive power (megatonnage) of their nuclear weapons, as
well as the number of nuclear submarines. (Mayers, 1984, P.
4 3 )
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To verify a nuclear balance, one can look to either a 
simple count or a strategic count Of nuclear capabilities. A 
simple count involves a mechanical counting of the number of 
missiles and warheads, payloads, size of warheads, hardness 
of silos, etc. A strategic count involves the determination 
of relative nuclear missile survivability, reliability, and 
equivalent megatonnage. (Baugh, 1984, P. 123) Perhaps the 
two most popular methods of measuring strategic equity how* 
ever, are lethality and equivalent megatonnage. Lethality 
measures a country's counter-force potential, while equiva­
lent megatonnage acknowledges that destructive power does not 
grow proportionately with yield and indicated counter-city 
potential. (Freedman, 1981, P. 369) The difficulty in measur­
ing a balance comes as much from unknown or unquantifiable 
factors (accuracy, tactics, reliability, yield, etc.), as it 
does from inadequate verification. Greater cooperation is 
needed on the part of each country to assure the other that 
parity does exist.
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III.__Proposals for the future
Whereas the first portion of this paper dealt with 
historical considerations, and the second with means toward a 
more peaceful atmosphere between the Superpowers; the last 
section of this paper will consist of the proposals that I 
feel should be adopted (and a couple that should not). A 
comprehensive test ban, a nuclear freeze, and arms reductions 
should all be adopted. On the other hand, the strategies of 
limited war fighting and disarmament should be abandoned once 
and for all.
Proposals to Abandon
Allow me to start with the latter first. Since the 
development of the atom bomb, there have been those who have 
advocated a limited war fighting capability. This attitude 
has been jointly shared by military leaders, strategists, and 
politicians. This is understandable, because if you have a 
nuclear capability, the natural tendency is to make it 
practical and useable. I have attempted to demonstrate 
throughout this paper my disdain for this reasoning and the 
destabilizing effect it has on international relations. In a 
Persian Affairs article from 1982, McGeorge Bundy, George 
Ksnnan, Robert McNamara stated "No one has ever succeeded in 
advancing any persuasive reason to believe that any use of
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nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably 
be expected to remain limited."(Kennedy, 1985, P. 28) In 
addition, what cannot be overlooked is the fact that there 
has never been a ruclear war, and nobody knows for sure what 
one would mean. Unilateral restraint may encourage a "low- 
intensity" response, if it is in the other country's interest 
to restrain itself (because of cost, danger, etc.). But if 
the other country's interests are not the same, the other 
country may seize the opportunity to gain a unilateral advan­
tage. Most strategic arguments are disputes of faith rather 
than fact. But some outcomes of nuclear warfare are factu­
ally known. The reality of a "nuclear winvjr," discovered by 
Carl Sagan and other leading scientists, was totally unex­
pected only five years ago. Their research indicates that 
even a limited nuclear war could trigger a nuclear w i m  and 
effectively terminate mankind's existence. By destroying the 
ozone layer and blocking sunlight with a layer of smoke and 
debris, temperatures would drop to 13 below zero, photosyn­
thesis would stop, and radiation from the sun would become 
deadly. (Mayers, 1984, P. 90)
Disarmament. whether unilateral or multilateral, should 
also be avoided because the disadvantages of this action far 
outweigh the advantages. The net result would be a much more 
dangerous world without nuclear weapons, than with then. 
Nuclear knowledge is irreversible. I do not believe that any 
country that is losing a conventional war that threatens its
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very existence will hesitate to put this knowledge to use in 
its desperation. Although this situation always exists, 
disarmament eliminates the deterrent effect of MAD, which 
greatly increases the likelihood of a conventional war—  
especially for states that have been restrained from action 
by the risks of nuclear war. Conventional wars once again 
become winnable, and the redevelopment and employment of 
nuclear weapons becomes the best option for a country in 
desperate circumstances.
In addition, the vast numbers of nuclear weapons now in 
existence virtually guarantee that a country will "cheat" and 
hide some in case of an emergency, or out of fear of the 
other country doing the same. Also, if the Superpowers were 
to give up their nuclear arsenals, a clandestine nuclear 
build-up, by an otherwise militarily inconsequential country, 
could completely upset the balance of power that currently 
exists. Recently, Israel has bean found to possess 
approximately 100 nuclear explosives, including hydrogen 
bombs. It was not known for sure before thac Israel even 
possessed a nuclear bomb, much less that they had one 
hundred. In the current world situation this fact merely 
upsets the balance of power in the region surreimding Israel. 
If disarmament had occurred, a non-diaaraing country could 
launch nuclaar first strikas against tha Superpowers, 
crippling tham bacausa of their diminishad Military 
capabilities.
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As bad an idea as multilateral disarmament is for world 
stability, unilateral disarmament is worse. Unbalanced, that 
is one-sided, reductions are dangerous and can lead to 
pre-emptive strikes and political blackmail. •'Unilateral 
disarmament might perhaps make our hands a little cleaner and 
save us some disagreeable expense; but so far from reducing 
the risk of war it might actually bring it nearer.** (Kennedy, 
1985, P. 54) Some individuals argue the inverse of "better 
dead than red" is true, that it is better to be red than 
dead. Though most would concede that the consequences of 
nuclear war are worse than the consequences of communist 
domination, unilateral disarmament presents a much greater 
risk of communist domination than the maintenance of deter­
rence presents of nuclear war. Thus, when the likelihood of 
the options are weighed, nuclear deterrence remains justifi­
able. In addition, the presence of multiple nuclear powers 
provides increased disincentives for unilateral disarmament 
because the opportunities for cheating are greater.
If only two nations have nuclear weapons, 
nuclear disarmament by one may provoke 
nuclear disarmament in the other... But 
if many nations possess nuclear weapons, 
disarmament by one can hardly be expected 
to provoke disarmament by all of the 
others. (Seitz, 1984, P. 149)
Although is has been argued that nuclear disarmament is 
better then the current nuclear stalemate because it costs 
1m s  to maintain; the risk of non-nuclear aggression 
increases. It does not stay the same. Disarmament is simply
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bsprooontativoo cannlttoo, ibss, P. at) in npt 'as, "it was 
fonoraliy asosptsd that tho oooeatlen of the nueloar eras 
raoa would i s p i n ,  aosng otbor stags, tbs oossatlon of tha 
tasting of nuelaar weapons .“(Spotoln, 1SS4, p. it) Perhaps
•0
the m r  treaty's results—  the reeovel of intermediate ais- 
silee froe Europe— sill provide the lepetue for a coaprehan- 
alve test ban. U.N. Ambassador Ctoesael suggested in taati- 
aony, the following!
The eoaplete cessation of nuclear weapons 
ie entirely rational only in an environ- 
aent in which our dependence on nuclear 
weapons is reduced by agreements which 
successfully achieve substantial raduc- 
tiona of deployed nuclear weapena.
(Mouse of Representatives Coaaittee,
19S9, P. »«)
The danger of not agreeing to a coaprehaneive taat ban 
ateaa froa the destabilising effects of new technology on the 
nuclear staleaate that currently exists. If the staleaata 
becomes an advantage for one side, the deterrent effect of 
parity may be lessoned or removed entirely, depending upon 
the significance of the qualitative iaproveaent. Thucydides, 
an Athenian ailitary thinker, correctly reasoned long ago 
that the development of radically new weapons is always 
accompanied by a disruption of the rules that govern 
international society. (Halle, 19t4, P. 79) During the 
Middle Ages ehivalric rules defined legitiaate behavior, but 
these rules were no longer applicable with the advent of 
aissile warfare, in a like aanner, nuclear weapons have 
replaced the rules of conventional warfare. Further qualita­
tive iaproveaents can only threw the international systaa 
into acre disarray. The Pinal Document of the I9?s U.N. 
Special Session on Disarmament includes the following conclu-
•1
■ion:
Tho costation of nuclear-weapon tooting 
by all atatos... would bo in tho intoroat 
of oankind. It would oako a significant 
contribution to... ending tho qualitative 
iaproveeent of nuclear weapons and tho 
development of now typos of ouch weapons 
and of preventing the proliferation of 
nucloar weapons. (Epstein, 1964, P. 43)
Clearly, tho tost ban is not likely to bo realised in 
tho near future because of tho opposition of tho Unitod 
States. However, in analysing tho reasons tho U.S. gives for 
not supporting tho teat ban, one realises that their primary 
concerns atea froa correctable fears regarding verification 
and parity. Moreover, the United States refuses to abandon 
its deairo to sake nuclear war aeceptable/fightable, through 
qualitative iaproveaents in nucloar weapons.
Since 19S7, tho Unitod States has wanted on-site 
verification of Soviet nuclear teats; however, the Soviets 
aaintalned that national technical aeana were adequate. A 
cos«on U.S. coaplaint is that it does not know who is 
actually ahoad in tho critical area of tactical weapons that 
the U.S. is supposed to hold an advantage. National 
technical aeana are incapable of eoaplete obeervations of 
nuclear tests under S000 tons, below 1000 tone HIM ia 
ineffective. (House of Representatives Coaaittee, 19SS. P. 
336) This is justifiable coaplaint booauae Boot tactical 
weapons fall within this yield range. Alone, this aay have
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been sufficient reason for the U.S. to not support a nuclear 
test ban. in that they had no accurate naans of verification. 
However. in 19C2-93. The V.I.S.R. acquiesced to three on-site 
inspections a year, but the U.S. deaanded seven and no accord 
was reached. "In refusing to accept the other side's pro­
posal. or to reach a conproaise, reflected a greater desire 
to continue testing than to roach an agroesant to stop test­
ing. "(Bpstein. 1994, P. 40)
There nay be another reason why the U.S. is loath to end 
the area race— ideologically it nakes the United States look 
good to the world. The United States is effectively keeping 
the Soviet Union an econonieally Third World nation by for­
cing then to expend a such higher percentage of their g .n .p . 
on defense than the United Statea. By accelerating the aras 
race, knowing the Soviet Union is connitted to respond in 
kind, the U.S. perpetuates an econonic advantage that trans- 
lates directly into world influence. Mtereaa the United 
States typically gives aid in the fora of aoney and food to 
other countries, the Soviet Union only has the resources to 
influence countries with cheap, ailitary weapons, as a 
result, auch of our aid cease froa faro surplus, while the 
Soviet aid takes the plaoe of doaestic consuaer goods.
The United States is trying to sake nuclear war 
fightable by technologically iaproving nuclear weapons 
through nuclear testing. Scientists believe that the atonic 
boab is not the ultiaate weapon. Zn the last fifteen years
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the atomic bomb has undergone a number of improvements:
explosiveness has been increased a thousandfold; weight has
been reduced; costa have decreased; and radioactivity has
been diminished. The defense department gives the following
justification for continued testing;
A reduction of the weight of the explo­
sive would reduce the weight of the 
rocket which has to carry the explosive.
By relatively inexpensive research and by 
nuclear experimentation which is called 
testing, wo can establish reliable 
defenses and incidentally save a national 
effort which is represented by a figure 
of perhape fio Billion. (House of 
Representatives Committee, 19B9, P. 334)
In addition, new tactical weapons do not produce excessive
radioactive contamination. "Further research would make it
possible to reduce this contamination to an insignificant
level."(House of Representatives Committee, 1984, P. 337)
Ny response to these improvements is twofold. First,
they are not necessary. Second, reducing the risks and costs
of nuclear war can only increase the likelihood that such a
war will be take place. Mien two hundred bombs can destroy
40 percent of the Soviet population and we possess over sooo,
the bombs do not need to be any stronger. Zn addition, our
defenses are already reliable. Zn the future, when the
materials in the warheads begin to deteriorate physically, z
propose that the test ban should allow for periodic testing
of random samples of existing weapons to ascertain that they
still work. Replacements can come from brand new versions of
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the existing models. Thus, such of the research and develop* 
sent costs can be eliminated, while parity is maintained. 
Reduced radiation is not a humanitarian development; it 
merely allows aggressor troops to occupy another's territory 
soon after a nuclear exchange.
Just as Z would make an exception in a nuclear test ban 
for the testing of aging, deployed missiles, Z believe that 
the peaceful use of nuclear weapons should also be excepted. 
"Ptoject Plowshare" is the name of a program for the future 
that will utilise the new lowradiation nuclear weapons to 
dig canals, move mountains of dirt, create mine pits, etc. 
However, these tests should be put under international 
authority, with all countries having access to the informa­
tion resulting from any developments. Also, all countries 
should have inspection privileges for any "plowshare" pro­
ject.
Although stopping the development of new nuclear weapons 
and qualitative improvements on existing ones is necessary 
befora arms reductions can take place, equally important is a 
"nuclear freese" that would prevent additional weapons or 
improved weapons from ever being deployed. Zt only seems 
rsasonabls that the arms raoe must first eoaa to a stop 
before it can be reversed. A nuclear frests would prevent 
the Introduction of some destabilising new weapons systems. 
Por example, ground-based cruise missiles are almost 
impossible to verify once they have been deployed. They are
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only eighteen-by-two foot in oiso. Thov hovo olroody boon 
dovolopod; therefore, tho only way to onsuro that thoy oro 
not uood to upoot tho balance-of-power ia provido that thoy 
oro not bo deployed. Obviously, truat with on-eite verifica- 
tion would go a long way toward helping tho poaoogo of a 
nuoloor freeso. Regardless, it io oupportod by tho vaot 
aajority of Americans. A — « (Nay 30, 1912) poll
found that 72 percent of tho American public favored a 
nuoloor fraasa. Zn fact, a mutual and verifiable froata was 
paasad by the Houae of Rapreaentatives in 1993, but it did 
not paea in tho Sonata.
Thoae oppoaed to the fraasa argue that ia would serve to 
perpetuate the instabilities of today's forces. X believe 
that the stabilising aeaaures Z have already described will 
aliainata this concern. It is sore likely that sodernisation 
wichout a fraasa will result in new generations of weapons 
even more dangerous than those already deployed. Xt is just 
as likely that any currant instabilities would increase as 
decrease with now deployments. The importance of the arms 
race to the military and those in military-related industries 
cannot ba underestimated. Johan Oaltung once said, with 
slight irony, that "The military establishments of the united 
States and the Soviet Union are eaeh other's bast friends-* 
neither ean exist without the other."(Pischer, 19S4, P. 69) 
There are primarily five reasons for the perpetuation of the 
arms race that need to ba recognised in order to ba overcome.
The first, is aors applicable to the U.S. than tha Soviet 
Union.
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branehas of tha sarviea (Arsy, Navy, 
ate.) ara jealous of one another. 
ta1engineltv of Solentlata- to develop 
new and aors sophisticatedweaponry.
(3)(4)
tsi Profited*lifey- Of weapons sales to 
govemaent (better than to private 
business). (Fischer, 19S4, P. 13)
Area reductions is a goal onto itself because of the 
treaendous aaount of aoney that is spent each year on 
defense. "In the saae world that spends about $1 Billion a 
ainute on weapons, S00 aillion people (about one fifth of the 
world's population) live in desperate poverty."(Turner, 1993, 
P. 1)
Zconoaic dislocations will occur, but the decline in 
productivity that will accoapany a gradual reduction in 
nuclear eras (not conventional forces) will be justified when 
one considers the possible benefits of nuclear eras 
reductions.
Tha aoney required to provide adequate 
food, water, education, health ana 
housing for everyone in the world has 
been estlasted at $21 alllion a year, it 
is a huge atm of aoney... about as auoh as the world spends on sms every two 
weeks. (Turner, 19*3, P. 9)
•7
In addition to tho nonotary savin?a deriving fron 
nueioar arms reductions, aro tho aooiatal bonofita that win 
occur whan tho focus of scioneo turns fron daatruction to 
production, "it least ono scientist and engineer in ovary 
four in eaployod in devising and testing new weapons aye- 
tone. "(Turnor, let), p. i)
I believe that a rovioed vsrsicn of Reagan*a ltli START/ 
"Build-down" progran would neet the following criteria for
future.
1.
3. Area rase stability- naintain 
predictability.
3. fiKlliUttifcllitXr naintain/lower incentives for nuclear use.
4. mrttitl 1 tty- agraaaiant possible in 
a roanonahle tine.
§. varlfleatlaa- can adequate verifica­
tion procedures he devised? (Harvard 
Group. 1MJ, P. 304)
The version oi START that was Introduced to Congress 
involves both tho reduction of existing siesiles and a 
concurrent build-down nochanlan that, in the future, will 
retire nore weapons then it replaces. Iventually, the 
build-down is to roach a level ef roughly one-half the is§4 
totals for either the Frye or Rent destructive capacity 
neasure— a level suggested by nany Congressional supporters. 
(Congressional Budget Office, 19S4, P. «S) Specifically, tha 
Congressional Bureau Office (CBO) has the following aosunp-
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The red u c tio n  o f  e t lM w iv i i m  U  e o o p a t lb ie  w ith  both  
th o  pw p i i i l i  o f  boofon  o n i Oorboehov fo r  th o  fu tu r e . but fo r  
d if f e r e n t  ro aoon o . In fo o t , th oy  ooch fo r oooo o n e -h a lf  
red u ctio n a  in  o ffo n o iv o  weapono by i f f * .  In a d d it io n , both  
Moofon and Oorboehov o n v ia io n  th a t  n u o ioar wo apona w i l l  bo 
a b o iio h o d  by th o  yoar a o ift. (Snow, l t S 7, o . ?0) Howov o r 
unwiao t h i s  « o a l io  in  to ro o  o f  o t o b i i i t y ,  i t  w i l l  novor  
ooour booaooo o f  th o  l nc o n p a t lb l l it y  th a t  e x io to  io  th o  area  
o f  d o fa n a iv a  weaponr y . N hereeo heapan o n v io io n a  th a t  n u c lea r  
d ia a ro ooont  w i l l  bo p o o o ib lo  booaooo o f  th o  p a r fo o tio n  o f  t h ’ 
SOI, th o  Sow io ta  a re  ad— n t in  t h e ir  poo i t  io n  i f i i M t  *opa- 
o e -a tr ik e *  we aponry . Thoy one SOX so  an o ffo n o iv o  weap on . 
Oorboehov n ot o n ly  w onts o a n p lo ta  n e e le o r  d ia a m aoont ,  ho 
w onts s  bon on sp o e o -s t r ih o  w eapons s o  w e l l .  (M ow . i t s ? ,  p .
n >
fo r  p o te n t ia l  n u c lea r  pow ers and th o  e o r r e n t n u c le a r  
o o w n tr iee  (a w o o p tin t th o  twps t p — re ) . X advoc a te  th e  
a d o p tio n  o f  a  e in ie u e  do to r r o n t o a p a b il i t y . I t  nay n o t bo 
M ir  t o  r e e t r i e t  o th e r  oo u n tr lo s*  v e r t loo t  p r o ll f o r o t io n , but
thdeo — — i fluMt m  0 0  axjlmisi to
deterrent. Right now, there Mlita two polos of powor, if a 
third country woro to dovtlop o largo oroonol It could 
"gong-up" with on oily and upoot tho nuoloor 
oto 1 o m to—  taking away a Superpower's NM> ratal latory 
capability. Thereby, taking away that country's datarrant. 
nils nay not ba aa hard for tha other nuolaar powers to 
aooapt aa it first saaaa. It is elaarly in their bast eco- 
noale internets not to try to eoapeta with tha arsenals of 
tha Superpowers. In addition, it is not necessary to protect 
their national security. "A country... whose only aia la to 
debar a nuolaar attaek, does not need a largo and highly 
aoeurofte aiasils fores, A snail but survivabla arsenal can 
provide note than adages to dot area noa."(flecker, 1M4, P.
U )  liallarly, tha oonoept of proportionality supports the 
a t M  ooaelttslsn. taarga Randy aald, "Iha losses that would
Imi 4h 1AA fif
oatwaigh « ty * gains' in delivering ton tines aa nuch to an 
enaay."(tiseher, l*dd, ». ti)
•afore tho Soviets had raaahad a NhP capability in the 
late m a s ,  they basically relied on a alalnaa deterrent 
arsenal to prevent an attaek by tha United States. Bven 
though the Sovlata aspired to ogulty in nuclear araa, tha 
Q.s. could gain neither sigeifleant political nor ailltary
-- Hinl r f 1 Fit fllillhl 1 ItY hiflAttAft »lkdh
Ihktal Mttulhhfl* M t  IhriWl Midi
capability (i.a. tha status-quo) argue that "If each aida had 
only a ainiaua deterrent... than a technological breakthrough 
in AM, ASM, or aona other vital area oould transfora that 
■ininun datarrant into no datarrant at all."(Ehrlich, 1985,
P. 94) Z baliava that in tha currant international ayatem 
thia would be a valid objection; however, tha eoaprehenaive 
teat ban, nuelaar freese and intruaive on-aita verificationa 
that Z reeoanend be enacted before a ainiaua datarrant posi­
tion is widely adopted greatly lasaon tha likelihood of such 
an oeourrenee. Moreover, if a technological breakthrough 
ware to occur, it ia by no naans assured that a country would 
bo able to find tha aoral justification to kill alllions 
without extreao provocation. Zn addition, any would be 
provocateur would likely book-down if faced with unacceptable 
looses, oven if victory wore likely.
Proa our dioouooion of proliferation it is dear that
aaay aero eountrioa will eventually develop the technology 
and activation to create their own independent nuclear 
arsenals. However, they need not enter the eras race to 
ensure their own safety and have a say in international 
politico. Minima deterrence capability, Halted by interna­
tional accord and subject to eittenelve International verifi­
cation, should be encouraged supplier nations, lut viola­
tions should subject a country to harsh international sane-
tlflac. fofffctuftAfcAlv* M i t  tittt tflwte nuoliir vtirmni
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cost-effective, politically enhancing, way to safeguard thair 
nations' security.
Tha Britiah and French govamaanta hava, 
by virtue of tha aiaa of thair indepen­
dent nuclear forcee, given thair aaala of 
approval to tha concept of ainiaua 
deterrence. However, that position, 
while credible for * supporting players' 
in a potential nuclear conflict ia not 
aupportable for the auporpowora. (thr- 
lieh, 1*19, P. 94)
•o far, z have advocated deterreneo, in the fora of 
Mutually Assured Deatruction (WU>), aa a aeana toward peace 
for the Buperpowera. But Z alao aupport aignifioant araa 
reductions. Thia aoeaing parade* ean bo roooneilad by ay 
propoaal for the Buperpowera* future, x have referred to it 
aa Mini-MAD. Thia paaudo-acronya atanda for Minieue Mutually 
Assured Deatruction, The baaio ooncluaion of deterrence 
theory ia that onee one haa an aaaured retaliatory capability 
that eneuroa the virtual daatruetien of the aggreaaor, the
coats to tha aggreaaor of attacking would be greater than any 
advantage that oould be aoerued free fighting. Thua, NAD 
providea a naans toward poaeo. Zn addition, our dioeuaoion of 
nullity of imoitiv wiiponi ini tfooonitratotf tbit i 
mini nr odvontnoo nrovidoo no viil nolitiool or illittw
a imolonr rtnlOMMfen ntioto * IdMi ftinorootf**
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•ri' preaent ooaaltMnt to tho araa raca practically aaauraa 
that a firat-atrike capability will not ba raarhad again in 
tha futura (and ehculd not ba attaaptad bacauaa of ita daata- 
bilising offact). Therafora, all weapona abova a Mini-KAD 
laval ara auparfloua and ahould ba aliainatad. Khrushav 
could hava baan apeaking about Nini-MAD'a utility whan ha 
aaid, "Tha raaaon why atataa aaintain araiaa ia praciaaly to 
hava powar that can withatand a poaaibla anaay and aithar 
raatrain him froa attacking or rapulaa hia if ho triaa to 
attack."(Freedaan, 1M1, P. 243) Clearly, what conatitutoa a 
Nini-IUD capability would ba tha aubjaet of groat dabatat 
nonetheleae, it providaa a theoretioal baaia for diacuaaion.
Zn auaaary, holding aach other hoataga— through tha 
terror of nuclear deterrence— -la not a groat aoral anawar to 
the qoeat for a peaceful worldi nevertheleea it ia 
otratogieally tha boat anawar right naw. Zn addition, "The 
longer it reaaina affoctiva, tho aero euatoa foraa and 
hardana, until at laot noma of behavior have baooaa 
aatabliahod that exclude tha raaort to violence."(Halle,
1M4, P. 112)
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